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Terminology 
 
MND = Motor Neurone Disease 
ALS = Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis  
EOLC = End of Life Care  
HCP = Health Care Professional  
BBN = Breaking Bad News 
 
The term HCP will be predominantly used in the introduction and literature review 
chapters to reflect the terms adopted in the wider literature reviewed. 
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Abstract 
 
Working with patients who are dying has been perceived as emotionally challenging 
(Meier, Back & Sean Morrison, 2001), with increased awareness of concepts such as 
burnout and compassion fatigue pervading the media and general public. The ambiguity 
into the conceptualisation of these terms as well as their increasing embeddedness in the 
medical model risks pathologising existential responses to the givens shared by all of 
humanity; mortality, temporality, and making meaning. Research in the field of death 
and dying continues to focus on areas such as oncology despite increasing prevalence of 
neurodegenerative diseases among the population (Talbot & Marsden, 2008). This 
research seeks to contribute to the field of MND by exploring the lived experience of 
doctors working with patients with MND. Semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with six participants, and subsequently analysed using interpretative phenomenological 
analysis (IPA).  
This research found that doctors were engaged in various meaning-making 
processes regarding their relationship to self and the other as patient. The super-ordinate 
themes identified focused on the way in which tensions were borne out of a dynamic 
movement of the inter-subjective relational encounter between self and other. These 
yielded three super-ordinate themes consisting of ‘It’s enjoyable, it’s depressing, it’s 
important’, ‘The boundaries between self and other’, and ‘People die’. The findings 
highlighted that though participants were engaged in practices of experiential avoidance 
to possibly distance themselves from the impact of their work, the relationality of the 
doctor-patient encounter had the potential to transcend the boundaries created. 
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Furthermore, the impact of working with patients dying from MND appeared to be 
mitigated by the meaning doctors attributed to their work and its existential context. The 
implications for Counselling Psychology and allied fields are discussed, as well as 
limitations and suggestions for future research. 
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Introduction 
  
The focus of healthcare policy has emphasised patient-centred care amidst a 
growing debate into continued dissatisfaction with end-of-life care (British Medical 
Association, 2016). Communication and issues surrounding death and dying have been 
cited as the most difficult areas of competency for healthcare professionals (HCP) 
(National Palliative and End of Life Care Partnership, 2015). End of life care is defined 
as care provided to patients who are likely to die within the next 12 months (National 
Palliative and End of Life Care Partnership, 2015). Despite centuries of physicians 
working with death and dying, negotiating the crucial intersection between life and death 
remains a difficulty (Kasket, 2006; Strack, 1997). The model that doctors operate within 
is predicated on objectives to prolong life and cure disease. The dying patient becomes 
“ipso facto, one of medicine’s failures, an unpleasant reminder of the limits of science” 
(Maclean, 1979, p.68). The inevitability of death and the infallibility of humans’ 
attempts to master their fate creates a tension within this model.  
Furthermore, the experience of caring for dying patients can be emotionally 
difficult (Meier, Back, & Sean Morrison, 2001; Robichaud, 2003). Though HCPs 
confront death and dying at various times throughout their career, the emotional 
challenges in these encounters are arguably varied and unique to each individual’s 
experience. A growing body of research has indicated increasing levels of stress, 
burnout, depression, and other psychological difficulties among physicians (Weinberg & 
Creed, 2000) and other HCPs, such as nurses and medical students (Badger, 2005; 
Ratanawongsa, Teherani, & Hauer, 2005). This has led to increasing rates of attrition in 
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the profession (Meier et al., 2001). Understanding how healthcare professionals cope in 
relation to their work with death and dying could have an impact on improving job 
retention, quality of life, patient care, and psychological well-being of doctor and 
patient.  
Motor Neurone Disease (MND) 
The choice of exploring the experience of doctors working with patients dying 
from motor neurone disease (MND) is borne out of an appreciation of the impact of the 
nature of the disease, and the dis-ease, which may accompany it (Bloomer, Endacott, 
O’Connor, & Cross, 2013). A significant proportion of the research literature available 
into the experiences of healthcare professionals caring for dying patients focuses on 
those working in the field of oncology (Dunn, Otten, & Stephens, 2005). There has been 
a lack of qualitative research into non-oncology diseases, especially in the area of 
neurodegenerative illness such as MND (Carter, McKenna, MacLeod, & Green, 1998). 
The prevailing research has focused on the experiences of patients and their caregivers, 
the latter defined as family members and close friends (Whitehead, O’Brien, Jack, & 
Mitchell, 2011). Motor neurone disease (MND) is a progressive neurological condition 
that is rare and for which there is currently no cure (Marsden, 2011). Approximately 
seven in 100,000 people a year in the United Kingdom (UK) will be diagnosed with 
MND (Talbot & Marsden, 2008). The condition is characterised by a degeneration of 
muscle function which leads to weakness and wasting of the muscles, resulting in 
difficulties with mobility, breathing, swallowing, and speech (Marsden, 2011). From the 
onset of symptoms, the average life expectancy is two to five years, accompanied by 
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rapid and progressive deterioration (Marsden, 2011). Although there are currently 
limited treatments for patients with MND, supportive measures are available to manage 
the symptoms of the condition.  
MND is the umbrella term referring to four disorders involving the degeneration 
of motor neurones in the body. Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is the most common 
type of disorder and is sometimes referred to synonymously in the literature, though this 
varies by country (Aoun, Bentley, Funk, Yoye, Grande, & Stajduhar, 2012). MND will 
be used in this research as it is widely accepted as a term to denote the wide range of 
diseases that can affect the motor neurones (Marsden, 2011). Research within the wider 
field of doctors’ experiences of death and dying have focused predominantly on 
breaking bad news (BBN) (Fallowfield & Jenkins, 2004). However, there are significant 
differences between delivering BBN to patients receiving a diagnosis of MND as 
opposed to cancer. Although each diagnosis of a disease will hold unique challenges for 
the patient and for the doctor, MND can be accompanied by a sense of ‘hopelessness’ in 
the context of being unable to offer the possibility of remission or a cure (MacLeod & 
Carter, 1999).  
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Literature Review 
The medical context 
When examining the literature on experiences of HCPs dealing with death and 
dying, a significant area of investigation has emerged regarding the difficulties in 
communication between doctors and patients (Fallowfield & Jenkins, 2004). A 
behavioural approach to these issues has influenced extensive quantitative research into 
ways to improve the techniques HCPs employ when having difficult conversations with 
dying patients (Friedrichsen & Milberg, 2006). The focus of these studies has ranged 
from the posture styles of physicians (Bruera et al., 2007), the use of negations and 
message framing (Burgers, Beukeboom, & Sparks, 2012) to an analysis of existing 
protocols to create communication-based models (Villagran, Goldsmith, Wittenberg-
Lyles, & Baldwin, 2010). This area of research has assumed that teaching doctors what 
to say and how to deliver terminal diagnoses can solve the problems of communication 
between doctors and patients.  
This has raised implications for medical practice advocating better teaching and 
training in death notification and death education in general (Gibbins, McCoubrie, & 
Forbes, 2011; Wear, 2002). However, it has been identified by colleagues such as Dr. 
Raymond Dempsey, a Counselling Psychologist working in the British Psychological 
Society’s end-of-life working party, that there is a lack of research determining whether 
these recommendations have been implemented (Dr. Raymond Dempsey, personal 
communication, 22 November, 2016). In addition, few evaluations exist into whether 
they have made an effective impact on communication between doctors and patients. A 
review of publication patterns in Death Studies found that, rather than increasing, 
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research into death education has declined, from 10% of the journal’s content to 2% over 
the course of 20 years (Neimeyer & Vallerga, 2015, p.568). The current exploratory 
literature inquiring into why there remains a discrepancy in preparation for end-of-life 
care and the realities of HCPs has identified that undergraduate medical education does 
not provide adequate preparation for junior doctors in their role in caring for dying 
patients (Gibbins et al., 2011).  
In addition, the evidence suggests that HCPs who find it difficult to 
communicate with patients about dying transfer the responsibility of having these 
conversations to other members of their team, such as palliative care specialists and 
nurses (British Medical Association, 2016). Griffiths, Ewing, Wilson, Connolly, and 
Grande (2015) conducted a qualitative exploration into the roles of District Nurses in 
breaking bad news about transitions to dying. Their findings suggested that while 
conversations about diagnosis and prognosis occurred, they rarely took place during the 
disease trajectory involving the transition to the dying phase, which left others, or no 
one, to initiate these discussions (Griffiths et al., 2015). It was also found that nurses 
often corrected the mistakes of consultants and doctors who censored information or 
gave vague information about prognoses (Griffiths et al., 2015). The findings 
highlighted the lack of attention given in the communication-based literature on 
breaking bad news to the process and transition to dying, which involves many different 
stages of bad news. Despite the Department of Health’s (2001) investment into training 
of District Nurses in the processes of palliative care, none of their sample had received 
this training despite many years of working in the field (Griffiths et al., 2015). 
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The barriers to obtaining adequate training or learning opportunities may be 
propagated in the organisational structures and social systems of the medical model. 
Rather than through formal teaching methods, it is widely acknowledged that learning 
about death and dying occurs through experience (MacLeod, 2001; Smith-Han, Martyn, 
Barrett, & Nicholson, 2016; Wear, 2002), the “informal curriculum” (Ratanawongsa et 
al., 2005, p.641), and from peers in the profession (Dosanjh, Barnes, & Bhandari, 2001; 
Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Studies examining death education have mainly used 
medical students as their sample population (Wear, 2002). However, few studies have 
examined how more senior physicians experience teaching about death and caring for 
the dying (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). This is an area of research that warrants further 
investigation due to the importance of the role modelling behaviours that peers and 
senior HCPs have on medical students (Dosanjh et al., 2001; Ratanawongsa et al., 2005). 
Students may undergo a socialisation process whereby they learn that death and dying 
has no place in medicine. The medical context and the professional identity that emerges 
create a tension when confronted with a dying patient. It is possible to understand why 
there would then be a concurrent lack of emphasis on death education within a medical 
culture that defines “death as failure” (Wear, 2002, p.271).  
The resulting challenges that a medical culture predicated on the values 
described are numerous. Conflict is created as doctors continue life-prolonging 
procedures when nurses have recognised the patient should be receiving end-of-life care 
(Bloomer et al., 2013; Hart, Yates, Clinton, & Windsor, 1998). In addition, doctors may 
delay the implementation of a palliative care approach (Mahtani-Chugani, González-
Castro, Sáenz de Ormijana-Hernández, & Martín-Fernández de la Vega, 2010), and fail 
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to “diagnose dying” (Kennedy et al., 2014). Therefore, aggressive and unnecessary 
treatments could be continued longer than is necessarily beneficial to the patient. This 
also has implications for achieving a “good death” and dying with dignity (Chochinov, 
2002; Chochinov, 2006). This may result in a lack of communication about reaching 
end-of-life care, which precludes important preparations and conversations necessary to 
achieve a dignified death (Volandes, 2015). When a patient does die, HCPs respond in a 
variety of ways to the dissonance created by the tension inherent in a medical culture 
that does not allow death to occur. Smith-Han et al. (2016) found that students who 
experienced the death of a patient were often left coping with the significant emotional 
impact, accompanied by a decrease in levels of empathy in order to manage the personal 
responses that emerged. These were exacerbated by the expectations and perceptions 
students had regarding their role as doctors, which did not include the death of their 
patients. 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1965) work on death and dying focused on a sociological 
perspective. Their exploration of the social loss of dying patients examined the 
interaction between hospital staff and patients, bringing in the “contexts of action” 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1964, p.viii). This represented a gradual shift in the understanding of 
the relationship between HCPs and patients, as being influenced by the context in which 
they worked, as well as extending the notion of defenses against death to physicians 
themselves (Fallowfield, Jenkins, & Beveridge, 2002). Glaser and Strauss (1965) 
adopted a deterministic and, at times, detached approach to assigning a dying person’s 
worth to their social value, and hence the expected impact on the experience of the 
nurses involved. Clark and LaBeff’s (1982) work on death telling draws heavily from 
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Glaser and Strauss’ (1965) model. Their findings attempt to delineate strategies to 
improve communication issues, which focus on providing guidelines to adhere to. 
However, these approaches arguably neglect the internal processes of the physician, 
which may be multi-faceted. Behavioural strategies based on a sociological perspective 
may be insufficient to adequately address underlying issues present in the doctor’s 
internal world, albeit embedded in a relational context. 
Other sociological approaches exploring HCPs’ responses to death and dying 
have been posited. Cain (2012) examined behaviours in a hospice using Goffman’s 
(1959) concept of the front and back regions, in which individuals present themselves in 
overt and covert ways respectively in everyday life. She explored the division of space 
between front stage and back stage behaviours in a hospice, with the front stage focused 
on displays of compassion, while the back stage consisted of dark humour and 
detachment. Her work found that the identities of hospice workers emphasised authentic 
emotional expression in the integration of a professional sense of self, rather than the 
dichotomous conceptualisation of fronts as performances and back regions as more 
authentic. This contributes a unique understanding to a constructionist perspective on the 
nuanced way in which HCPs’ communicate and how medical training may benefit from 
an appreciation of the role of so-called back regions in facilitating the development of a 
professional sense of self. On the other hand, Nordström, Fjellman-Wiklund, and 
Gryself (2011) developed an interesting experiential approach using drama as a 
pedagogical tool to teach medical students how to deliver death notifications. Actors 
were used in video recorded role-play scenarios with medical students. The Marathon 
Death exercise allowed teachers and students to become actively engaged in self-
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reflection, observation, as well as developing strong relationships with colleagues 
(Nordström et al., 2011). This exercise represents an example of teaching that capitalizes 
on “teachable moments” (Jackson et al., 2005, p.654). Death education that focuses on a 
fixed sequence of steps or a protocol can become problematic when individual patients 
and responses are not accounted for (Pullen, Golden, & Cacciatore, 2012; Villagran et 
al., 2010). 
Emotional dilemmas may emerge from the lessons taught within the medical 
model on how to manage emotions. There is a consensus that expression and reflection 
is an important part of dealing with difficult emotions (Meier et al., 2001; Sanchez-
Reilly et al., 2013). However, there is uncertainty over how this is negotiated in relation 
to a dying patient (Malterud & Hollnagel, 2005). Fears of over-identification (Kasket, 
2006), a lack of control (Friedrichsen & Milberg, 2006), and the emergence of a 
professional identity predicated on objective detachment (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005) 
contributes to a sense of difficulty in negotiating the emotional turmoil embedded in the 
experience of caring for the dying. Robichaud (2003) has identified that not enough 
attention is granted to the role of emotion in clinical setting, whereby it is treated as an 
experience to be ignored, avoided, or endured. Some HCPs have been found to apply the 
“Mother Test”, whereby feelings about the situation is transferred to one’s own feelings, 
helping to humanise the situation, in this instance, to think what one would do if the 
patient was your mother (Pattison, Carr, Turnock, & Dolan, 2013). Others describe a 
balancing of responses between active and presence focused modes of being 
(Whitehead, 2014), which both had different functions in dealing with the emotions that 
arose in encounters with dying patients.  
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Compassion fatigue and stress 
The impact of caring for the dying can result in a variety of challenges for HCPs 
such as loss of meaning, loneliness, depression, anger, frustration, burnout, moral 
distress, and compassion fatigue (Aiken, Clarke, Sloane, Sochalski, & Silber, 2002; Edo-
Gual, Tomás-Sábado, Bardallo-Porras, & Monforte-Royo, 2014; Meier et al., 2001). In 
the last twenty years there has been an increased focus on the impact of the stress 
associated with caring for the dying (Neimeyer, Wittkowski, & Moser, 2004). Burnout 
has been found to result from stressors that arise from HCPs’ interactions with the work 
environment, while compassion fatigue evolves as a consequence of the relationship 
between clinician and patient (Kearney et al., 2009). For the purposes of this research, 
compassion fatigue is a more relevant concept as a result of its focus on the interpersonal 
caring relationship.  
However, an issue identified in the literature highlights that often burnout, 
secondary traumatic stress, compassion stress and compassion fatigue, are conflated, 
contributing to the lack of clarity in the understanding of the terms. Sorenson, Bolick, 
Wright, and Hamilton’s (2016) integrative review of the existing literature addressing 
compassion fatigue demonstrated the need for the development of a concept analysis to 
adequately and clearly operationalise the terms for future research. Sorenson et al. 
(2016) believe that compassion fatigue represents the “cost of caring” (p.456) which 
manifests in a range of physical and psychological symptoms, contributing to the 
decision of HCPs to exit the profession. Therefore, it is important to understand how 
different types of emotional distress impact the HCP when addressing issues of job 
retention, quality of life, patient care, and psychological well-being. There may also be 
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an economic imperative that can account for increased research into issues of burnout 
and compassion fatigue that leads to exiting caring professions. 
Joinson (1992) coined the term compassion fatigue to describe a reduced 
capacity for compassion as a result of the exhaustion arising from managing the 
suffering of others. Crawford, Brown, Kvangarsnes, and Gilbert (2014) used a narrative 
literature review to investigate the tensions between individual and organisational 
responses to the demands for compassion interactions in health care. They argue that the 
focus on enhancing compassion in individual practitioners should be widened to 
examine how this type of care can be integrated into the design of healthcare systems. 
This locates the barrier to compassion to that of healthcare systems themselves. Much of 
the literature focuses on the individual, but Crawford et al.’s (2014) work into the design 
of compassionate care warrants acknowledgment that the systems and cultures in which 
individual HCPs work, will impact the relationship they have with patients. The concept 
of ‘bidirectional compassion’ (Brown, Crawford, Gilbert, Gilbert, & Gale, 2014; 
Crawford, et al., 2014) advocates healthcare systems fostering compassion towards both 
staff and patients. Research in this area has thus far predominantly explored how the 
individual practitioner themselves may develop their own compassion, which is borne 
out in the suggestions for greater self-care practices (Kearney, Weininger, Vachon, 
Harrison, & Mount, 2009). However, Gilbert, McEwan, Matos, & Rivis’ (2011) work 
has suggested that some people may demonstrate active resistance to engaging in 
compassionate experiences or behaviours, as a result of a general fear of affiliative 
emotions. Therapeutic interventions may be beneficial in developing compassionate 
practice because it explores how a person’s relationship to compassion and how they 
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regulate threat-based emotions is understood within the context of a HCP’s own history 
and psychological profile. It is possible that self-care may clash with (dying) patient 
care, as the defence strategies employed by HCPs to protect themselves could ultimately 
become barriers to engaging in the needs of dying patients. 
Burnout, compassion fatigue, and moral distress are regarded as resulting from 
ineffective coping strategies. What follows is a brief exploration into some of the main 
strategies that have been identified in the literature, with a focus on those employed 
when coping with caring for the dying. Badger (2005) described coping strategies used 
by nurses on a Medical Intensive Care Unit, when transitioning from cure- to comfort-
oriented care. A variety of cognitive, affective, and behavioural techniques were used to 
cope with end-of-life care transitions. Cognitive strategies included ‘putting up with it’ 
(death), visualisation, learning from experience, reminiscing, and putting things into 
perspective, while behavioural strategies involved retreat, avoidance, and distancing 
behaviours (Badger, 2005, p.66-67). Affective strategies included laughter, externalising 
feelings, and using compartmentalisation to manage emotions (Badger, 2005, p.66). 
Compartmentalisation is often cited as an important defence mechanism (Robichaud, 
2003). It can have different functions, from enabling a healthcare professional to attend 
to basic care needs first (Kasket, 2006) to shutting off painful emotions in a difficult care 
situations (Whitehead, 2014). Ablett and Jones’ (2007) qualitative study using IPA 
found that humour was considered important for hospice nurses when working with the 
dying. They suggested that humour has protective functions, sometimes as a substitute 
for considering existential issues, which may act as a defence against confronting 
aspects of mortality and spirituality that create discomfort (Ablett & Jones, 2007). The 
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emergent themes highlighted the role of hospice nurses’ active choice to work in 
palliative care and their attitudes to care-giving, life, as well as work. These were 
identified as important in demonstrating how personality constructs of hardiness and 
coherence related to the concept of resilience.  
Their research forms part of a shift in focus from a pathogenic paradigm focusing 
on burnout to a salutogenic framework encompassing the possibility of health and well-
being when confronted with stressors (Ablett & Jones, 2007). However, these paradigms 
dichotomise the types of coping strategies to the categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. 
Nonetheless, an over-reliance on capturing the experience of caring for the dying within 
a stress model limits the experiential reality of HCPs and begins with an assumption that 
the experience is one of stress. Operating within a framework that seeks to ascertain 
diagnostic criteria for compassion fatigue and burnout may also pathologise the 
experience of HCPs. This raises potential issues for HCPs accessing psychological 
services, as their distress may only be considered for treatment if it is diagnosed or 
recognised as a psychopathology. 
Thus far, the stress of caring has been examined in terms of compassion fatigue. 
However, caring for the dying has been identified as a specific stressor in itself (Peterson 
et al. 2010). Moral distress or ‘moral pain’ has been identified as one source of 
emotional difficulty (Pattison et al., 2013). Unexpected deaths, working with young 
patients who are dying, and patients with whom HCPs identify with are cited as 
particularly difficult (Jackson et al., 2005; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). End-of-life 
decisions also raise issues as they may involve ethical difficulties that create moral 
conflict. Some of these decisions include withdrawal of treatment and life-support 
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machines, pain management, symptom management, organ donation, and advance 
directives (Yang & Mcilfatrick, 2001). This moral conflict can create moral distress. 
This occurs when individuals feel that they are restricted from acting using moral choice 
or when they act against moral judgment (Ledger et al., 2012). These constraints may be 
internal, such as lack of personal resolve, or external, resulting from situational factors 
such as a lack of resources or hierarchical decision-making (McCarthy & Deady, 2008). 
 End-of-life care decisions can raise moral and ethical issues that create a state of 
psychological disequilibrium in HCPs who are aware of what the right thing to do may 
be but are constrained from acting accordingly (McCarthy & Deady, 2008). This could 
also occur in vice versa, whereby HCPs are forced to make decisions that they do not 
believe in. For example, conflicts may arise when families want to continue treatment, 
while doctors have emotionally withdrawn and agreed to continue treatment, and nurses 
have had firm convictions that further treatment is unnecessary. To a certain extent, 
doctors are able to withdraw both emotionally and physically from situations such as 
these to alleviate emotional discomfort. On the other hand, nurses have to attend to the 
family and patient on a regular basis over a period of time (McMillen, 2008). This 
increases the opportunity for confronting issues around mortality, which may result in 
HCPs confronting their own existential concerns (Mount, 2003). Aside from a few 
commentaries (Lowry, 1997; Mount, 1986; Shanafelt, Adjei, & Meyskens, 2003), there 
exists little research into the experience of existential distress and suffering on the part 
of HCPs themselves (Aase, Nordehaug, & Malterud, 2008). Existential concerns in the 
field of death and dying continue to focus predominantly on patients’ experiences 
(Barnett, 2009; Boston, Bruce, & Schreiber, 2011; Cressey & Winbolt-Lewis, 2000; 
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Strang, Strang, Hultborn, & Arnér, 2004). 
Death anxiety and attitudes  
Having examined the responses that HCPs may experience as a result of caring 
for the dying, it is important to understand the attitudes towards death that may underpin 
those experiences as they have been identified as an influential factor in encounters with 
the dying (Forbes, 2011). The Frommelt Attitude Toward Care of the Dying scale 
(FATCOD) and the Death Attitude Profile-Revised (DAP-R) scale are two of the most 
commonly used psychometric measures available to assess HCPs attitudes towards death 
(Dunn et al., 2005; Leombruni et al., 2014). However, investigations into the robustness 
of the FATCOD scale have suggested unsatisfactory internal consistency scores 
(Leombruni et al., 2005). In regards to the DAP-R (Wong, Reker, & Gesser, 1994), 
caution can also be considered when evaluating the results garnered by any study using 
this assessment tool. Tranter, Josland, and Turner’s (2016) study into nurses’ 
bereavement needs and attitudes toward patient death used the DAP-R survey, which 
found a strong correlation between spirituality and religion with the dimension of 
approach acceptance in their sample. However, the statements coded for this label all 
involved a religious understanding of approaching death, therefore it is already a likely 
possibility that spirituality and religion will strongly correlate to approach acceptance. 
This has implications for how the latter is understood in the literature, because in this 
instance religion and spirituality are operationalised as one category. This foregoes an 
understanding of the nuances between the two entities as well as overshadowing the 
consideration of a greater myriad of experiential possibilities involved in ‘approach 
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acceptance’. If the attitudes measured include those such as death anxiety then it raises 
questions about what conclusions and comparisons can be obtained from quantitative 
findings based on different conceptualisations of terms. This is significant considering 
the doubt that has been raised in the psychological literature on the difficulties of 
operationalising terms such as death anxiety (Neimeyer, 1994).  
Potential gains associated with dealing with death and dying have been 
investigated by those who advocate a positive psychology of death acceptance (Wong & 
Tomer, 2011). Death acceptance involves using an awareness of death to create a life of 
meaning, growth, and authenticity. Wong and Tomer (2011) posit a dual-system model 
of coping with death that involves two different motivations and life orientations 
interacting between approach and avoidance systems. The area of death acceptance is a 
relatively new field of research but can be seen to form part of a move towards a 
systematic engagement with death that fulfils “the twin desiderata of theoretical and 
practical relevance” (Neimeyer et al., 2004, p.333). In addition, death acceptance is 
aligned with the philosophical underpinnings of existential-phenomenological 
approaches to death. An awareness of my death can influence the way I, as a human 
being, live my life and make meaning from the limits of my existence. It can allow a 
person to take a stance upon their life that creates purpose, possibility, and meaning. 
Frankl’s work on meaning-making logotherapy is based on an understanding of human 
behaviour as motivated by a will to meaning (Frankl, 1969/2004). The anxiety 
accompanied by an awareness of death is seen as inextricably linked, for “Being-
towards-death is essentially anxiety” (Heidegger, 1927/2010, p.266).  
 23 
Ernest Becker’s (1973) work examined the ways in which culture, hero-systems 
and self-esteem are used to assuage individuals’ anxieties about death. Psychopathology 
is seen to arise from difficulties in managing the terror, namely the awareness of our 
death, which distinguishes humans from all other living things (Becker, 1973). In 
addition, this consciousness of mortality conflicts with a basic and primal instinct to 
survive. Influenced by Becker’s work on the impact of death awareness, terror 
management theory (TMT) posits that to buffer against overwhelming death anxiety, 
humans invest in cultural worldviews and self-esteem. The work of Greenberg, 
Pyszcynski, and Solomon (1986) developed robust empirical support for this hypothesis 
(Burke, Martens & Faucher, 2010; Greenberg, 1969) by creating mortality salient 
situations that increased access to death-related thoughts, instigating an increase in 
worldview and self-esteem defences.  
Few studies have examined TMT in regards to HCPs’ experiences of caring for 
the dying, despite the particularly relevant context of an explicit mortality salient 
working environment. Sliter, Sinclair, Yuan, and Mohr’s (2014) study into trait death 
anxiety, mortality salience, and occupational health provides an interesting foray into 
how death anxiety affects nurses, using a multi-point survey. Their findings suggested 
that trait death anxiety was associated with greater levels of burnout and reduced levels 
of engagement (Sliter et al., 2014). In this instance, mortality salience cues were 
identified as dealing with injured and dying patients. However, working with dying 
patients does not necessarily have to be a traumatic experience simply because it 
involves mortality cues. Furthermore, their conceptualisation of death anxiety as a 
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personal characteristic rather than a temporary state assumes that a person’s relationship 
to death is stable and pre-determined. 
Existential philosophy would consider anxiety to be a fundamental part of 
‘Being-towards-death’ (Heidegger, 1927/2010), thus challenging the notion of only 
some people having a death anxiety trait. In addition, Sliter et al.’s (2014) 
conceptualisation of death anxiety in relation to general anxiety and depression 
presupposes that these terms share the same ontological underpinnings. Although they 
use a river analogy to reflect how death anxiety lies in deeper water than other types of 
anxiety, less influenced by external and internal factors, it could be argued that it lies in 
a completely different river altogether. To neglect the difference is to risk pathologising 
the existential dimensions of what it means to be human.   
Nonetheless, more qualitative research is needed to understand the processes by 
which death attitudes impact a healthcare professional and their relationship to dying 
patients. Psychometric assessments have been identified as resting on a poor 
conceptualisation of death attitudes limited to death anxiety, which has been confounded 
by its difficult operationalisation within the field of Counselling Psychology. Self-report 
questionnaires are predominantly used, which are at risk of social desirability bias and 
inaccurate recall. Empirical findings have rested on data that is inconsistent, without the 
use of well-validated and multidimensional measures of death attitudes (Neimeyer et al., 
2004). The majority of analysis into the attitudes towards death of HCPs has been 
assessed by quantitative measures, which focuses on identifying the relationship 
between death attitudes and a variety of personality characteristics (Chen, Del Ben, 
Fortson, & Lewis, 2006; Neimeyer et al., 2004). For example, psychological constructs 
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such as self-efficacy and emotional intelligence (Aradilla-Herrero, Tomás-Sábado, 
Gómez-Benito, 2012) have been examined in relation to death anxiety. Moreover, 
longitudinal studies into death attitudes of HCPs have yielded contradictory results. 
Dickinson, Tournier, and Still’s (1999) quantitative study compared responses to a 
questionnaire sent to physicians at the beginning and end of a twenty-year period of 
medical practice. The questions explored the impact of twenty years of medical practice 
on the attitudes of physicians towards terminally ill patients. They concluded that 
physicians experience greater discomfort and are more anxious about death the longer 
they have been practising (Dickinson et al., 1999). However, earlier in their study they 
offer contradictory findings that physicians in 1996 (compared to 1976 when first 
surveyed) were more willing to discuss prognoses with terminally ill patients, were more 
confident, and did not consider treating a dying patient as unpleasant as twenty years 
after graduating medical school (Dickinson et al., 1999). This suggests other 
confounding variables that warrant further exploration.  
The predominance of cross-sectional and correlational designs which do not 
assess confounding variables that may affect death anxiety, have yielded few applicable 
results in relation to determining a causal relationship between death anxiety and the 
variables investigated (Neimeyer, 1994). Thiemann, Quince, Benson, Wood, & Barclay 
(2015) used a longitudinal research design to understand medical students’ death anxiety 
in relation to its severity, gender differences, trajectory during medical education and its 
associations with students’ attitudes toward palliative care and their psychological 
health. Their findings suggested that those reporting higher death anxiety had 
significantly greater self-reported rates of anxiety and depression (Thiemann et al., 
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2015). A strength of their study lies in their application of a multidimensional measure 
of death anxiety, which acknowledges the complexities of death anxiety and how it 
impacts attitudes.  
From a relational, inter-subjective perspective, the death of the other must also 
have an impact on me. Heidegger’s concept of vorlaufen (anticipation) argues that only 
the “running-ahead” to your own death can lead someone to their own-most, authentic 
Being because dying is something which nobody can do for another (Kaufmann, 1959, 
p.85). Death is constituted ontologically by an “always-mineness” and existence 
(Kaufmann, 1959, p.85). What follows is that, death is not constituted as a loss, but as a 
loss experienced by survivors because we cannot genuinely know the dying of others 
without experiencing the act of death itself. Thus, we can always only be present. 
Papadatou (2000) and others have identified that HCPs do experience grief and 
bereavement processes when their patients die (cf. Behnke, Reiss, Neimeyer, & 
Bandstra, 1987; Marcella & Kelley, 2015; Sansone & Sansone, 2012; Shorter & Stayt, 
2010). This is conceivable considering that the extent to which there is an attachment in 
a relationship, there will be a loss to grieve (Worden, 2010). However, Corn’s (2010) 
research into oncologists’ bereavement practices demonstrated that doctors did not 
engage in these in order to maintain appropriate boundaries between physicians and 
patients, due to a fear of burnout. However, doctors may not have been aware of these 
practices or could have omitted from reporting them. Although research exists into the 
loss of patients and its impact on HCPs (Pessagno, Foote, & Aponte, 2013; Wald, Reis, 
Monroe, & Borkan, 2010), there has been little investigation into other processes of grief 
that may occur before the death of a patient. Further research is warranted in areas such 
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as anticipatory mourning (Combs, 2010; Fulton, Madden, & Minichiello, 1996) and 
disenfranchised grief (Doka, 2002) as these constitute experiential possibilities that may 
inform the care-giving relationship.  
Implications for Counselling Psychology  
Extensive further investigation is needed into how Counselling Psychologists can 
best support HCPs in this emotionally demanding field of work. HCPs experience 
emotional and moral distress, as well as depression, anxiety, and stress-related 
difficulties (Weinberg & Creed, 2000). Other phenomena such as existential distress, 
and feelings of helplessness and hopelessness have yet to be examined, specifically in 
relation to HCPs themselves, in any detail by researchers. These are all areas of the 
human condition that Counselling Psychologists attend to in their daily therapeutic 
practice. Nonetheless, there remains an unexplained dearth of literature on Counselling 
Psychology’s contribution to providing psychological support to HCPs in the area of 
death and dying. Currently, mindfulness-based interventions have formed a significant 
portion of available supportive measures for HCPs (Weinberg & Creed, 2000). This has 
been informed by a stress paradigm, discussed earlier in this review, whereby the 
therapeutic tasks are to alleviate stress experienced by HCPs. However, the results of 
mindfulness-based interventions have varied in reducing stress-related psychological 
distress. Galantino, Baime, Maguire, Szapary, & Farrar’s (2005) analysis of salivary 
cortisol levels before and after an eight-week mindfulness meditation program found 
weak correlations between changes in measures and statistically non-significant 
findings. However, Martín-Asuero and García-Banda (2010) found a significant 
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reduction in distress, rumination, and negative affect in a group of health professionals 
who had received a mindfulness-based stress reduction program over eight weeks.  
Few psychologists are actively included in healthcare teams, even in specialised 
palliative care teams (Kasl-Godley, King, & Quill, 2014). Dr. Melaine Coward, the 
Head of School of Health Sciences at the University of Surrey, explained that during her 
training, consultant psychologists were brought in to see nurses in exceptional 
circumstances, for example, when a ward had experienced multiple patient deaths 
successively (Dr. Melaine Coward, personal communication, 21 February, 2017). This 
area warrants further investigation into what has marginalised psychologists’ roles in 
these healthcare teams. This can contribute to further understanding in how to remove 
obstacles in the provision of effective and appropriate psychological support to this 
vulnerable client group. Kasl-Godley et al. (2014) has advocated that psychologists gain 
further education and training in managing team dynamics. In addition, being able to 
identify risk and protective factors against common phenomena such as burnout and 
grief is an important area of competency for psychologists working within healthcare 
teams (Kasl-Godley et al., 2014). Golijani-Moghaddam (2014) has identified numerous 
entry points for practitioner psychologists in palliative care, specifically in primary care 
settings. Their work recognises the emergence of a bio-psycho-social framework in 
medicine that supports and advocates a role for psychologists in the delivery of holistic 
model of health care. HCPs have also begun to identify a bio-psycho-social model as an 
alternative healthcare model, to include psychological support for HCPs who cope with 
daily end of life situations (Cipolletta & Operandi, 2014, p.24). 
Gray-Toft (1980) identified a new role for Counselling Psychologists in assisting 
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HCPs develop resources for coping with difficulties experienced in hospital 
environments. It was considered that Counselling Psychologists had appropriate skills 
and expertise to support the psychological needs of these individuals, both as 
independent practitioners and members of healthcare teams. Although this role was 
identified more than thirty years ago, little has been done to expand upon Gray-Toft’s 
(1980) recommendations, despite the continued need for psychological support to be 
made available to HCPs working with the specific stressors and experiences involved in 
death and dying. Counselling Psychologists are in a position to be able to explore the 
functions of symptoms arising from caring for the dying from humanistic and 
existential-phenomenological approaches (Piazza-Bonin, Neimeyer, Alves, Smigelsky, 
& Crunk, 2016). The existential perspective is uniquely poised to address the needs of 
individuals grappling with existential concerns confronted in healthcare contexts. It 
offers an alternative framework to traditional models that may emphasise pathology, 
adjustment, and achievement (van Deurzen & Adams, 2016, p.194).  
Rationale for research 
Although the literature review explored the existing research, which uses a range 
of different HCPs as participants, the rationale for focusing on doctors specifically is 
linked to the lack of qualitative research into the experiences of doctors within the field 
of MND, and the wider area of death and dying. The current dearth of literature 
attending to the potential issues for doctors working with patients dying from MND, 
leaves this particular client group vulnerable to a variety of mental health difficulties 
(Weinberg & Creed, 2000). Dealing with death and dying has been shown to have an 
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impact on doctors’ psychological well-being (Meier et al., 2001; Wallace & LeMaire, 
2009), as well as on their relationships with others (Duarte, Pinto-Gouveia, & Cruz 
(2016), at the heart of which lies the patient. Counselling Psychologists have a role in 
providing psychological support for those working in this demanding field, which needs 
to be founded on a solid empirical evidence base as part of the ‘scientist-practitioner’ 
model within which we work (Woolfe, Strawbridge, Douglas & Dryden, 2010).  
Research aims and research questions 
This study aims to gain an in depth understanding of the lived experience of 
doctors working with patients dying from MND. Part of this understanding includes an 
awareness of the potential existential impact of this work, and its effect on doctors’ 
relationships with patients. The research question is therefore, ‘what is the lived 
experience of doctors working with patients dying from MND?’ 
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Method 
Methodology 
Consideration of methodologies  
 A qualitative approach was chosen to best capture the lived experience of 
participants as it rests on epistemological foundations that are compatible with the 
research question and aims of the study. Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) 
has been chosen to explore the experiential landscape of those in a healthcare setting 
(Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999). Thematic analysis was also considered, however its 
emphasis on pragmatic concerns and its deductive elements, rendered it an inappropriate 
methodology with which to answer the research question.  
 Discourse analysis (DA) was investigated, but dismissed as an appropriate 
methodology. DA’s predominant epistemological focus on how participants construct 
their experience through the use of language meant it was incompatible with the research 
aims exploring the way in which doctors make meaning of their lived experience. 
Furthermore, DA’s attention to discursive practices may fail to attend to the embodied 
dimensions of participants’ experiences. Embodiment is relevant to the existential 
conceptual framework used and potentially constitutes an important part of the physical, 
as well as psychological, responses to working with patients dying from MND.  The use 
of narrative analysis (NA) may have been an alternative methodology in which to 
explore doctors’ lived experiences, as a result of its focus on meaning-making and the 
preliminary use of narrative therapies in end-of-life care training (Neimeyer et al., 2004). 
However, the researcher’s lack of familiarity with this methodology, as well as the 
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established use of IPA in areas of health and existential psychology, affected the 
decision to choose IPA for the purposes of this research. 
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
 IPA emerged from the philosophical approach of phenomenology, which focuses 
on the study of experience (Smith, Flowers, & Larkin, 2009). Husserl (1936/1970) 
conceived of phenomenology as a return to “the things themselves” (p.53). He proposed 
several eidetic reductions regarding époché, or bracketing, which were intended to 
remove our pre-conceptions and assumptions from understanding the essence of the 
phenomena revealed in a particular experience. However, Heidegger challenged the 
notion that a person could bracket preconceived ideas in order to objectively describe 
phenomena (1927/2010). This challenge was based on the assumption that subjective 
meaning is co-created through the experience of being in a world with others, embedded 
in specific contexts. IPA moves away from the emphasis on description and 
transcendentalism of Husserlian phenomenology to a greater focus on the “perspectival 
directedness of our involvement in the lived world” (Smith et al., 2009, p.21). This 
approach engages with a participant as a “person-in-context” (Larkin & Thompson, 
2012, p.102). This research is aimed at examining the doctor in context, as a meaning-
making creature in a co-created relational dynamic with patients that cannot be explored 
in isolation. 
 Hermeneutics is a second theoretical underpinning of IPA, concerning the theory 
of interpretation. Although it was originally considered separate from phenomenology, 
hermeneutic phenomenology has developed from philosophers such as Heidegger 
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(1927/2010). This hermeneutic shift is engaged with examining the appearance of a 
phenomenon, while implicating the researcher in the process of interpretation that makes 
sense of this appearance. Thus, the researcher is engaged in a “double hermeneutic” 
which involves the researcher “trying to make sense of the participant trying to make 
sense of their personal and social world” (Smith, 2004, p.40). Knowledge is therefore 
considered to be co-created within an inter-subjective relationship, situated amidst a 
background of the researcher’s own landscape of pre-conceptions. This demonstrates the 
constructivist epistemology that underpins IPA, which understands knowledge as 
constructed through an interaction with others, mediated by our culture, language, and 
unique perspectives (Willig, 2013). Reflective journals, as well as peer and academic 
supervision are part of a reflexive practice that takes into consideration the relationship 
between self, other, and context through a process of feedback and reflection. Finlay 
(2008) has described this as a dance between attempting to bracket pre-understandings 
and using them as sources of insight (p.5).  
 The phenomenological method is designed to explore the lived experience of 
people, rather than how it may be conceptualised as a set of techniques or procedures 
(Boston et al., 2011). This resonates with the objectives of the research to focus on 
doctors’ subjective encounters with the patient as other. IPA’s emphasis on matters of 
existential import render it an appropriate methodology for which to understand how 
doctors make sense of their experience of working with dying patients (Smith, 2017). An 
investigation into how meaning is made in the field of death and dying also necessarily 
implicates the researcher because I, too, am bound by the same existential givens as a 
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result of the fact that we are all human beings, faced with the inevitable fact of death 
(Visser, 2017).  
 Although IPA studies often engage with universal themes, idiography is also a 
major influence (Smith et al., 2009, p.29), which emphasises a level of detail in the 
depth of analysis conducted. Furthermore, IPA is committed to making sense of how 
particular phenomena are understood within a particular context, from the perspective of 
a particular person (Smith et al., 2009). IPA’s idiographic commitment and its roots in 
psychology are appropriate to the research objectives. This research hopes to make a 
contribution to an existing body of knowledge as well as to contribute to the practice of 
Counselling Psychology for this potential client group. This may involve presenting 
alternative psychological interventions, as well as informing pre-existing support 
services for HCPs. IPA engages similar values to that of Counselling Psychology, 
underpinned by a phenomenological attitude of openness, flexibility, and an appreciation 
for the primacy of the client’s lived experience on an embedded, embodied, and 
temporal dimension (Woolfe et al., 2010).  
Epistemological underpinnings 
IPA is situated within a critical realist paradigm, that does not seek to find one 
truth or answer, but rather a justified account that is grounded in the words of the 
participants (Pringle, Drummond, McLafferty, & Hendry, 2011). The focus is on how 
and what meaning is made from experiences, while trying to capture the complexity and 
content of this meaning, rather than trying to quantify and measure its frequency. 
Therefore, a qualitative approach may be particularly useful to elucidate the nuances of 
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phenomena that have eluded quantifiable measures. Multiple interpretations are made, 
aiming not to necessarily confirm theories or empirical findings but to contribute to the 
understanding of phenomena and the existing field.  
Qualitative methodologies, such as IPA, aim to find an individual’s subjective 
truth rather than an absolute truth (Langdridge, 2007). This is based on an understanding 
of reality as multiple, subjective, and mediated by individuals’ thoughts, beliefs, 
expectations and judgements (Langdridge, 2007). IPA assumes attributing meaning to 
events that shape experiences are products of interactions between people engaging in a 
social world (Willig, 2013, p.96). Therefore, the universal criteria often used to evaluate 
whether research has reached an absolute truth is incompatible with many qualitative 
methods that do not aspire to achieve replicability and generalisability. Validity and 
trustworthiness may be more appropriate criteria with which to evaluate whether 
research has been carried out to a high standard and whether it can generate useful 
knowledge (Sandelowski, 1993). Issues of validity were attended to by adhering to 
Yardley’s (2000) criteria for qualitative research, while incorporating Smith (2011)’s 
suggestions of what ‘good enough’ IPA research entails. This acknowledges that high 
quality IPA research rests on a creative process that allows criteria for validity to be 
flexibly applied based on each unique study (Smith et al., 2009). The criterion Yardley 
(2000) has advocated for upholding the validity of qualitative research has been adhered 
to in this study, with respect to the four core elements she outlines; maintaining 
transparency, sensitivity to context, commitment and rigour, as well as impact and 
importance. 
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Limitations of IPA 
Although IPA was chosen as the most appropriate research methodology in 
regards to answering the outlined research question, an examination of its limitations is 
warranted. Firstly, IPA relies on participants’ ability to express and effectively 
communicate the rich and complex texture of human experience. Furthermore, its 
emphasis on a person’s linguistic repertoire assumes that a person’s verbal account is an 
accurate representation of their experience. However, this has been challenged from a 
constructionist position by scholars such as Willig (2008), who argue that language may 
construct multiple realities rather than one definitive description of a person’s 
experience.  
Secondly, IPA’s concern with how reality presents itself to people in different 
contexts, situated within their “lifeworlds” (Husserl, 1936/1970, p.138), has been 
criticised for potentially limiting our understanding of phenomena. It is argued that this 
is due to an exclusive focus on the appearance of phenomena, without a consideration of 
their cause or origin (Willig, 2013). However, IPA favours neither explanation nor 
description as an epistemological endeavor, but rather seeks to understand the role of 
human subjectivity in the creation of knowledge, using description as “a means to that 
end, rather than an end in itself” (Willig, 2007, p.223). The emphasis on individuals’ 
“making sense of” (Smith & Osborn, 2015) and its awareness of the researcher’s 
interpretative role in the co-construction of knowledge demonstrates an understanding of 
the multiple ways in which individuals make meaning out of phenomenona (Smith & 
Osborn, 2015). 
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Design 
Participant inclusion and exclusion criteria 
IPA studies recommend using a sample size of between four to ten participants, 
for doctorate projects (Smith, 2011). This can allow for a thorough and in-depth 
examination of participants’ subjective experiences. Thus, a sample size of six 
participants was chosen, subject to recruitment feedback. Purposive sampling was used 
as the aim of IPA is to collect detailed information about experiences of a fairly 
homogeneous group of a specific topic (Langdridge, 2007). Participants were selected 
based on meeting the inclusion criteria on a first come first serve basis. The inclusion 
criteria for participating in the study were that potential participants needed to be 
qualified doctors who had had experiences of working with patients with MND. This 
criteria was set on the basis of exploring experiences from a relatively homogenous 
sample. Different emphases on clinicians versus researchers were not considered as it 
was understood through anecdotal research that doctors working in the field of MND 
predominantly have both clinical and research roles.  
The main exclusion criteria for participating in the study was that participants 
needed to have a minimum of two years working with patients with MND. This was to 
ensure that participants would have had an experience of a patient dying as a result of 
MND, an experience which forms part of the exploration of the research question. 
Recruitment  
The recruitment process began with contacting the Motor Neurone Disease 
(MND) Association, which is a charitable organisation that focuses on research, 
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improving access to care, and campaigning for people living with or affected by MND. 
Their research department posted a tagline and a link to the recruitment poster 
(Appendix A) on their social media platform. In addition, information provided on the 
poster was included in a newsletter which is distributed to MND clinicians on the 
national register. Unfortunately no participants made contact. Contact was then made 
through emailing doctors directly (Appendix B), using information provided on the 
MND Association website, which details various MND centres around the United 
Kingdom. Changes to the recruitment strategy were included in amendments to the 
ethics application and approved by the University of Surrey Ethics Committee 
(Appendix C). Six participants replied to the recruitment email and logistical details of 
interviews were subsequently arranged. 
Procedure 
Interviews were conducted in locations convenient to the participants’ 
workplace. All of the interviews were held in a private meeting room arranged by either 
the participant or the researcher. A university colleague was informed of the time and 
location of interviews, in adherance to the ethical guidelines outlined in regards to 
maintaining the safety of the researcher. Five of the interviews ranged between one hour 
and 70 minutes. One of the interviews was 25 minutes. Although this could be 
considered short for a qualitative interview, it was regarded as rich in data and provided 
significant results with which to include in the analysis. Furthermore, the shorter 
interview length may be meaningful in itself, which IPA would judge to be important in 
relation to the way in which participants make sense of their experience.  
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Data collection 
An interview schedule (Appendix D) was created for conducting semi-structured 
interviews and used in a flexible relational manner (Finlay, 2011). Questions were open-
ended and designed to allow participants to speak freely. The majority of the questions 
on the interview schedule were asked during interviews as they were sufficiently broad 
to allow a dialogical conversation with sufficient clarity and elaboration. Typed 
verbatim transcriptions were then completed by the researcher, stored securely, and 
audio-recordings deleted after transcriptions made. 
Ethical considerations 
This research was conducted in line with the British Psychology Society and 
University of Surrey research ethics guidelines (BPS, 2009). These were prioritised 
throughout the research process. An information sheet (Appendix E) and consent form 
(Appendix F) were sent to participants a week before the interview to ensure time was 
granted for the participants to read and understand the information provided, as well as 
allowing time for any questions or concerns that arose from this phase of the research. 
Participants were provided with a paper copy of both the information sheet and consent 
form. Audio-recordings were transferred onto a protected offline hard drive and stored 
securely in line with GDPR guidelines. Interviews were erased from the audio-recorder 
after transcripts had been created. In order to protect participants’ right to anonymity and 
confidentiality, all identifying data in the transcripts were anonymised. This was 
particularly important as there are relatively few doctors specialising in MND in the UK, 
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thus the greater potential for recognition and loss of anonymity. Therefore, references to 
geographical locations have also been changed to protect anonymity. 
As participants chose to voluntarily contribute to the study, they had the right to 
withdraw from the study up until the completion of data analysis. This was specified in 
the information sheet as two months after the interview. Relevant contacts were 
provided on the information sheet in case of any issues or complaints. Participants were 
not subjected to any intentional harm, however the possibility of emotional distress must 
be acknowledged. Difficult emotions may have arisen in the process of recalling and 
reflecting on difficult memories and experiences, which needed to be handled sensitively 
and respectfully. The information sheet (Appendix E) provided included a list of 
relevant services to access psychological support. Specific services concerned with 
issues of bereavement and loss, such as Cruse Bereavement Care, were included as the 
research explores experiences with MND in relation to death and dying. 
The research supervisor was notified of any interviews that took place outside of 
the University campus, to ensure the safety of the researcher. Any emotional distress that 
arose from the interviews for the researcher were explored and supported through 
personal therapy and in supervision. This was also processed in the reflexivity that 
constitutes an important part of the underpinnings of an interpretative phenomenological 
research study.  
Analytic strategy and procedure 
 The analytic strategy adopted used Smith et al. (2009)’s suggestions for IPA data 
analysis. Although IPA involves a set of common processes and principles, these can be 
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applied flexibly within an inductive and iterative cycle (Smith, 2007). IPA involves 
interpretation, rather than explanation or pure description. This process involves the 
hermeneutic circle, consisting of a movement between the part and the whole, on a 
series of levels, in a non-linear, dynamic style of analysis to reach a deeper level of 
interpretation whereby latent meaning emerges (Smith, 2007). The research involved 
maintaining a journal to engage in reflexive practice, which is a significant component 
of the methodology.  Thoughts, observations, feelings, and reflections were noted down 
throughout the research process. 
The first step of the analytic process involved multiple readings of the transcripts 
of individual participants. This facilitated an active engagement with a participant’s data 
while also ensuring that the participant was at the centre of the analytic inquiry (Smith et 
al., 2009). Transcripts were formatted in columns, leaving space for initial noting 
(Appendix G). Exploratory comments were made during this step (Appendix H), as 
reading prompted thoughts and observations that may have been useful in forming later 
ideas. These exploratory comments could be considered akin to free-style textual 
analysis (Smith et al., 2009). Transcripts were then formatted in a more structured table 
with columns (Appendix I) using linguistic, descriptive, and conceptual comments 
colour coded alongside the text, as recommended by Smith et al., (2009). The inclusion 
of linguistic comments enables the analysis of the relationship between the language 
used and the content. This is part of IPA’s iterative endeavour to move between the 
whole and the constitutive parts, while also creating links between descriptive and 
conceptual comments (Smith et al., 2009). 
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The second formatting enabled the analysis of discrete sections of text as well as 
the development of emergent themes, which were included alongside the left hand side 
of the text. Emergent themes were collated into a mind map (Appendix J) to provide a 
clearer visual aid and un-folding of the key themes emerging from the data. Once initial 
notes had been made, emergent themes were developed, breaking up parts of the whole 
to examine them inidividually and returning to the whole as informed by the 
hermeneutic circle (Smith, 2007). Connections between themes were explored, leading 
to the development of super-ordinate themes that captured the overall meaning of 
clusters. This involved identifying patterns through various strategies such as 
abstraction, subsumption, polarisation, contextualisation, and numeration (Smith et al., 
2009, pp.96-98). The analytic process described thus far was then repeated for each case, 
followed by an examination of patterns across cases. A master table of super-ordinate 
themes was created from all the participants’ data, including sub-ordinate themes and the 
presentation of frequency (Appendix K). 
Efforts were made to hold onto the interpretative and phenomenological 
elements of the analytic process by reviewing interpretative comments and 
corresponding quotations, ensuring that interpretations were grounded in participants’ 
accounts. Although IPA does not seek replicability, it is important that another 
researcher would be able to understand how interpretations were derived from the data, 
though it may not necessarily be the one they would adopt (Yardley, 2000). Throughout 
the data collection and analytic process, there was  a discernible trail of methodological 
decisions that provides an understanding of the interpretative choices made (Annells, 
1999). As tentative meanings unfurled to illuminate key themes of participants’ 
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experiences, an iterative movement occured throughout as the core experiential content, 
the ‘objects of concern’, were checked and clarified in regards to the origin of any 
emergent interpretations (Larkin, Watts, & Clifton, 2006). The analysis sought to 
capture the individual nuances of both individual and collective experience, 
demonstrating areas of both convergence and divergence (Smith, 2011).  
Reflexivity 
IPA as a methodology is familiar to me as a researcher, as I had previously 
conducted an IPA study as part of a postgraduate degree. In addition, its emphasis on 
lived experience and the primacy on subjectivity resonated with my work as a trainee 
Counselling Psychologist. Difficult emotions did arise for participants in the interviews, 
and I may have wanted to include an exclusion criteria for participants who had 
experienced a recent bereavement. However, the topic chosen necessitated an 
exploration of death and dying which involved the possibility for histories of loss to 
emerge. The potential for emotional distress was acknowledged in the recruitment 
strategy and a list of support services was provided to mitigate any possible distress.  
The steps described in the analytic strategy served as a useful guide and 
anchoring point from which to ground the process that at times felt adrift when fully 
immersed in the data. Engaging in a piece of text would open up a set of unfolding ideas 
and trail of interpretation that needed to be grounded in the participants’ accounts. Their 
experiences almost formed a beach, shifting naturally as it settled along the bedrock as 
they made sense of their experience, while the process I was engaged with constituted 
the moving sea, fluid but in need of containment as it lapped against the shores of their 
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stories. I do not have any personal or professional experience with MND. However, I 
have been interested in the field of death and dying for several years based on my 
studies in existentialism and therapeutic training. I first became aware of MND through 
a television series called ‘My Last Summer’ on Channel 4 (McKerrow, Christie, & 
Smith, 2014) which explored the journeys of five terminally ill people. I was moved by 
the series and struck by the difficulties faced with having MND. This led to a curiosity 
of how others may experience this disease and what the implications might be for all 
involved. 
Analysis 
 
The analysis undertaken reflects the co-construction of knowledge inherent in 
IPA. Analyses should be treated as tentative hypotheses that have been grounded in the 
experiences of participants expressed in the transcript. This is to facilitate the 
idiographic and iterative process that reflects the “double hermeneutic” of my position 
as a researcher attempting to make sense of another person making sense of their 
experience (Smith, 2004, p.40). Underlined words represent the original emphases of 
participants. Extracts and quotes from participants are referenced in square brackets by 
using the first initial of the participant, followed by the line number. The initials 
correspond accordingly; Brian (B), Ian (I), Peter (Pe), Max (M), and Paul (P). The 
research question explores what is the lived experience of doctors working with patients 
dying from MND?  
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Table One: Master Table of Themes 
 
Super-Ordinate Theme Sub-Themes 
‘It’s enjoyable, it’s depressing, it’s 
important’ [J.56-57] 
‘We’re dealing with sad situations’ [B.140] 
The negotiation of distance 
Identification as an emotional grenade 
Feeling the feelings 
The boundaries between self and 
other 
‘Certainly not me’ [J.106] 
‘You’re never going to know what that’s going to 
be like’ [M.367-368] 
‘It’s not happening to me but it could’ [M.762-
763] 
A healthy doctor-patient relationship 
‘People die’ [J.146] The factors of life 
‘Watching life swivel on a sixpence’ [P.220-221] 
Being an expert 
‘All doom and gloom’ [Pe.191] 
Note. [#.#] [Initial of participant and line number]  
Super-Ordinate Theme One: ‘It’s enjoyable, it’s depressing, it’s important’ [J.56-
57] 
Introduction 
The experience of emotions featured in many of the participants’ accounts of 
their lived experience of working with patients. Emotions functioned as important 
signals to some participants, highlighting when they may be reaching a point of being 
unable to cope, or functioning as a normalised reaction to the experiences involved in 
working with dying patients. A tension emerged between which emotions could be 
expressed and the importance of feeling the feelings that arose. This pressure appeared 
at times to coalesce in the expression of certain emotions, bound in a medical context 
and the implicit, as well as explicit, rules of what constituted a doctor-patient 
relationship. This super-ordinate theme explores what it means for participants to 
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experience the feelings that appear in their work with patients dying from MND, and 
what it means for them not to feel or express those emotions. 
Sub-Ordinate Theme One: ‘We’re dealing with sad situations’ [B.140] 
I’d worry if I got to a point where I just didn’t experience any of the emotions, and 
I’d worry if I didn’t experience any of the negative emotions because we’re 
dealing with sad situations…I find I feel some of the sadness of the situation. 
[B.138-142] 
 
For Brian, feeling the ‘negative emotions’ in response to what is considered to be a 
‘sad situation’ is a marker of a normalised or acceptable reaction to working with 
patients who are dying. His emphasis on ‘feel’ demonstrates an embodied response, 
though it has limits as he states that he feels ‘some’ of the sadness, which is attributed to 
the situation and not located in any specific individual. The lack of ownership over 
feeling all of the sadness creates a sense of distance to the emotion that appears to be 
managed to an extent. On the other hand, Brian reveals the function of sadness in being 
able to do his job well.  
 
I can’t see myself doing the job well if I had no sense of the sadness at someone 
with an unexpected diagnosis of a life-shortening condition that’s going to 
disable them and cause their premature death. I think if you don’t get that 
that’s sad then stop and re-group. [B.154-159] 
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His reference to ‘get that’ suggests an inherent understanding needed to 
recognise that sadness is involved when being with someone with a terminal diagnosis. 
The visceral image he describes of an unexpected, life-shortening, disabling, and 
terminal condition serves to amplify the severity of a condition that justifies a 
commensurate reaction. Not understanding this response serves as an indicator that he 
needs to ‘re-group’. It is as if his understanding of sadness as a ‘normal’ response to a 
‘sad situation’ is inextricably tied to what doing his job well means for Brian. Similarly, 
Ian uses the emotional responses to his work as an indicator, albeit as a way in which to 
gauge his emotional well-being. However, this does not appear clear to him as he 
questions how he would know if he was experiencing burnout; ‘I ask myself that 
question, if I was burning out, how would I know? Um what would be the sort of checks 
and balances? Who would tell me?’ [I.50-53]. His search for an external moderator of 
his internal emotional well-being may suggest he does not trust his own ‘felt-sense’ 
(Gendlin, 1978). Ian later clarifies his initial self-questioning by acknowledging that his 
job is challenging. 
 
…Doesn’t feel easy and that’s kind of good, that’s my check and balance 
really…feels really hard, feels difficult ten years on it feels difficult, that’s my 
check and balance, that I’m not burnt out yet. [I.1140-1146]  
 
Ian’s repetitive use of ‘check and balance’ emphasises the difficulty of this self-
monitoring, which has lasted over the span of a number of years. Feeling potentially 
negative emotions and experiencing the difficulty of the work that they’re engaged in 
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seems to serve a normalising function. It is also an indicator by which Ian and Brian may 
measure the extent to which they are able to cope with the emotional challenges of their 
work.  
Sub-Ordinate Theme Two: The negotiation of distance 
 
Various tensions emerged among some of the participants’ negotiation and 
management of the expression of emotions. Peter talked about the ways in which he was 
only able to see patients for ‘snippets’ [Pe.459] of time, which affected how much of the 
dying process he was ‘privy to’ [Pe.463]. I had wondered whether this temporal 
experience facilitated a method of ‘detachment’ that had been previously discussed 
[Pe.435]. He continued by explicating a tension between an empathic approach, 
characterised by feeling, and what constitutes being a good doctor. This tension 
appeared to culminate in a process of detachment, which was considered an essential 
and functional part of being ‘a good doctor’ [Pe.436]. He stated, ‘there needs to be an 
element of detachment otherwise you’d never get up and see the next patient and be a 
good doctor for them’ [Pe.435-437].  
Peter’s understanding of helpful and unhelpful feelings further reinforced the 
functional nature of emotions. He appeared to manage these by actively resisting certain 
emotions that might cause discomfort, in this instance frustration, ‘I fight off some of 
those feelings because…it’s not a helpful feeling to have’ [Pe.649-651]. He later 
explained the way in which an empathic approach had to be managed. 
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…We’re not robots clearly and we have to do, I like to think I do, have…that 
empathic approach um but at the same time I don’t think you’d be a good 
doctor if that allowed, if that became too prominent so you can’t break down 
crying or - and it depends what underlying personality, I’m sure some doctors 
do in particular cases um but it’s about that professionalism and you’re there to 
provide information to the patients, try to give them any management therapies 
that might be available um…to move forward…[Pe.467-479] 
 
Peter emphasises his humanity in the contrasting image of not being a robot. His use of 
‘we’ suggests his positioning as a doctor in this extract and a possible identification with 
a collective identity. He shifts to hoping that he has an empathic approach, which is 
aligned with not being a robot. However, he adopts a both/and position by suggesting 
that, while the empathic approach is needed, this must be managed. The result of an 
empathic approach that would be ‘too prominent’  is described as breaking down crying. 
He notes that there are exceptions, and this is attributed to differing personalities. 
However, it appears that what is ultimately at stake is professionalism. This is described 
further in terms of what professionalism entails, which involves rather feeling-free 
activities. The contrast of enabling patients to ‘move forward’ as opposed to the 
breaking down of crying suggests a movement away from a potentially difficult place to 
be with. Peter’s opinion that without detachment he wouldn’t be able to get up and see 
the next patient highlights the potentially functional nature of detachment as a process in 
the management of emotions when working with dying patients. 
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Ian echoes aspects of Peter’s experience by referring to the importance of 
compartmentalisation. Detachment suggests an active cutting off process whereas the act 
of compartmentalisation may indicate that certain feelings are present but placed outside 
of Ian’s awareness. This is supported by Ian’s sanctioning of crying, albeit delineating 
where and when this can be done, ‘you can do that later and that’s healthy, but you do 
not do it in front of [patients]’ [I.484.485]. There is a time and a place to be sad. Ian is 
clear about the active process of compartmentalisation he is engaged in and the reasons 
behind it.    
 
Oh that’s definitely compartmentalisation, it’s too horrific really. Um it’s too 
er…you know I think I’ve cried three times…Never at the time, I mean that 
would be unforgivable, I say that to medical students that you know it might 
sound harsh but it’s unforgivable as a doctor if you cry in front of the 
patient…it is not about you…because you burden them you know I know that 
sounds very draconian but I just feel that that’s crossing a line, it’s getting into 
that thing about becoming, trying to be too aligned…I usually hold someone’s 
hand and I will often have a very sad face on, that’s not forced. [I.474.491] 
 
Compartmentalisation may protect him from what he describes as horrific, 
similar to Max’s description of the ‘horror of clinic’ [M.382]. Furthermore, Ian links the 
importance of compartmentalisation to a good doctor-patient relationship. This 
importance appears to be enshrined in a set of rules that he himself teaches to students. 
There is a metaphorical line that serves as a boundary between self and other that 
 51 
prevents an alignment or what may feel like an uncomfortable merging. The 
performative aspects of sadness, such as holding someone’s hand and having a sad facial 
expression, communicates sadness to the other. This could also imply a defensive mask 
against his own sadness and fear of showing this emotion in front of the patient, serving 
a purpose to protect both of them while presented as if to serve only the other. He 
suggests that it is an authentic communication, ‘not forced’ but there appears to be an 
active and powerful force that manages Ian’s emotions from becoming ‘too aligned’. 
This is enabled by the description of crying as unforgivable, which characterises crying 
as possibly transgressing a set of rules bound in right or wrong.  
The possibility of forgiveness implies almost an act of sin, with significant 
consequences as he uses words such as ‘harsh’ and ‘draconian’. Emotion is framed as 
potentially burdensome, something that the patient might have to carry. In contrast, Max 
describes ‘sharing this burden’ [M.284-285] with his work colleagues, not in the 
expression of the emotions that might be felt ‘that’s not to mean we have to sit down you 
know and have a group hug or anything’ [M.282-283], but in the knowledge he is not 
alone, ‘by not seeing this as some sort of lone ranger scenario’ [M.274-275].   
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Sub-Ordinate Theme Three: Identification as an emotional grenade 
 
Thus far, the meaning-making processes that emerge in the tension between the 
expression of emotion and the professionalism of the doctor-patient relationship have 
been explored. Ian expresses his sadness, with a ‘very sad face’ [I.491], but he tries not 
to become ‘too aligned’ [I.489]. This suggests a similarity or possible identification, 
which features in other participants’ accounts of when it has become perhaps more 
difficult to manage the feelings that arise when working with dying patients. All 
participants expressed a degree of the challenging nature of emotions when ‘difficult 
cases’ [I.567-568] arose, specifically when patients were young or had families of their 
own. Peter described how ‘there have been times when it really does sort of hit you’ 
[Pe.204-205] when working with younger patients with families, as he has children 
himself, ‘so you do project some of those things on yourself’ [Pe.273-274]. His use of 
the term projection demonstrates a psychological mindedness and potential awareness of 
a psychological process occurring. It is possible that this allows him to attribute the 
challenging nature of these particular cases to a process out of his control. This bears 
similarities with Max’s experience of a memorable patient and how the emotions which 
arose impacted him. In both cases, it appears that becoming ‘too aligned’ emerges from 
an identification with patients who have families.  
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So it’s very difficult to hear that kind of thing if you’re a parent and not 
be…there’s always going to be these kinds of things that are absolutely on the 
edge of human suffering that if you’re not bothered by those you’d…you know 
be problematic but so…you know I’ve managed to on, those relatively rare 
occasions when my own emotions were going to kind of decompensate, to work 
out how to just hold it together and then actually, patient goes and I go see my 
colleague Anne and you know…you know just let go but…I think that’s good 
and normal but what the patient isn’t coming to you for is to see you get upset, 
they’ll think it’s not about him, why’s he getting upset? I don’t think you’re 
going to win with patients or help them or get their trust by being emotionally 
incontinent um so you do have a professional responsibility to try and be 
sufficiently distant but then occasionally you just get these kinds of grenades 
thrown into the conversations that are very difficult to to really separate from 
your own experience. [M.498-526] 
 
The need to express a justified emotion and where this is expressed appears to be 
managed by suppressing the emotion, ‘hold[ing] it together’, until it is allowed 
expression with a colleague. Decompensation can be understood from its medical 
definition, as ‘the loss of physiological compensation or psychological balance’ 
(Decompensation, n.d.). Max seems to lose this psychological balance in the midst of a 
process of identification. These are described as ‘grenades’, evoking images of 
explosions, war, and conflict for myself as the researcher. Grenades are thrown over 
distances, over walls, and behind enemy lines. It is as if the grenades Max speaks of are 
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those that invade the space that he has created to separate off his own experience, 
powerless to stop them and out of his control. Losing control of his emotions, becoming 
‘emotionally incontinent’ [M.519-520], also appears to conflict with the professional 
responsibility he refers to, similarly to Ian and Peter. For Max, this professional 
responsibility seems to mean creating trust, ‘winning’, and helping patients, all of which 
requires a sufficient distance. It may be that Max is referring to an emotional distance, 
and his reference to ‘sufficient’ further suggests a process of management that he is 
engaged in to determine what feels adequate. The ‘grenades’ appear to cross this 
distance and destroy his attempts at controlling the process of emotional suppression.  
 
Sub-Ordinate Theme Four: Feeling the feelings 
 
All participants talked about emotions that arose through their work with 
patients, yet there were varying extents to which these emotions were experienced on an 
embodied level. John describes his clinics as ‘enjoyable, it’s depressing, it’s important’ 
[J.56-57]. His short sentences are closed as if to ward off further inquiry. When asked 
about the emotional impact of the death of his patients, he reports that he’s ‘ok with it 
because I can switch off’ [J.62]. To a certain extent, John appears aware that he may be 
engaged in an active process of not feeling the feelings. On the other hand, there is a 
sense that Peter was actively immersed in the emotions he was experiencing. He brings 
emotion into the research interview itself, as his voice wavers intermittently and 
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becomes imbued with emotion, processing the inevitable death of not only a patient, but 
a friend; ‘he’s a patient, he’s also a friend’ [P.297]. 
 
He’s now starting to notice weakness in his arms you know that’s progressing 
um we both know how that goes um you know at some point we both know he’ll 
die um…yeah…that that will be difficult…[long pause] yeah. [P.641-644] 
 
They appear to be on this journey alongside one another, as Paul refers to ‘we’. 
They are together in the knowledge that he will die, and it feels as though Paul is 
involved in the initial stages of a process akin to grief, ‘Ah it’s it’s um…ah it’s 
um…[voice becomes tearful] it’s an emotional thing to think about’ [P.680-681]. When 
asked how he manages these feelings, Paul describes how he doesn’t think about it, 
laughing quietly afterwards, as if he is aware of the process of denial that he might be 
engaged in.  
 
I just go in a circle [draws a circle with his finger in the air], so the minute I 
think about it I think just work harder because you know that he wouldn’t have 
he would you know he’s contributed so much, I he um… [P.648-652] 
 
Although Paul may be referring to denial, it appears that he experiences this on a 
cognitive level, in not ‘thinking about it’, but is able to feel it on an embodied level, 
expressed in the tearfulness of his voice. His emotional experience forms part of a 
circular framework that motivates him to ‘work harder’. It also possibly reveals the 
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intransigent and unending nature of his experience. Working towards ‘the same goal’ 
[P.662] becomes something that connects Paul to his patient but also functions as a way 
in which to potentially avoid feeling the totality of the loss that is anticipated. ‘He 
wouldn’t have’ becomes ‘he would’ as the allusion of the past tense brings the first 
suggestions of the lived experience of his friend’s death into the present. ‘I he’ blurs the 
distinction between self and other, creating a sense of confusion as to who this 
experience belongs to, while also illuminating that it may be experienced by both.  
 Paul’s narrative demonstrates the extent to which he is able to experience the 
emotions that arose during his work with a particular patient. The doctor-patient 
relationship he has appears to allow the experience of these emotions, though it is not 
clear to what extent the emotional valence has had on their professional relationship. 
However, Paul does not mention issues of professionalism in his account, which could 
suggest that for him, professionalism and emotions have not needed to be managed 
within a dichotomous either/or relationship. This is not to suggest that other participants 
do not have an emotional experience in regards to their work with patients. Ian describes 
a ‘delayed thing’ [I.566] after a ‘weird weekend’ [I.558-559] when he was faced with the 
death of a 19-year-old patient. Ian feels the emotions at a time and place where he may 
feel more comfortable, though it is experienced alone and briefly. 
 
…About two weeks later I was at home doing nothing, sat on my own and I just 
burst into tears for no reason [inaudible] it lasted about two minutes and no 
one saw and I didn’t feel sad afterwards, it felt better and that’s just happened 
maybe a couple of times. [I.559-565] 
 57 
Emotions have thus far been discussed in relation to the experience of doctors 
working with patients, however there is also the presence of a third, namely patients’ 
relatives, that was considered in many of the participants’ accounts. Participants 
described how patients experience emotions in relation to their diagnosis and the 
disease; ‘there’s a big shock, but the next time I see them they’re actually amazingly 
relaxed’ [I.392-393]. Nonetheless, Ian describes how relatives of patients appear to ‘feel 
the feelings’ on behalf of the patient. He refers to Oscar Wilde’s (1891/2008) The 
Picture of Dorian Gray to figuratively paint an image of the relative’s embodied 
experience of emotion. 
 
I don’t know if you’ve ever read Picture of Dorian Gray…all of that negativity 
has now appeared in this face of the spouse and as the process goes on, it’s 
almost as if it’s all drained out of the patient and it’s etched on the face of the 
spouse and by the end of the process, the spouse often wants to say ‘actually, 
I’ve had enough’. Of course that’s an awful thing to say…’ [I.393-400] 
 
The result of this process akin to projective identification ends with the spouse 
declaring that they have reached the end of their limits. It is unclear whether Ian 
expresses his judgment of what the spouse has said or what he has spoken of as ‘an 
awful thing to say’. Nevertheless, the lack of clarity may indicate a blurring of the 
distinction between the thoughts and feelings of himself and his patients’ spouses. Ian 
describes his awareness of spousal risk of depression, which prompts him to focus part 
of his meetings on their wellbeing. He reports that their response is often to cry which ‘I 
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don’t want to happen but it’s good cos it means that they can get that off their chest’ 
[I.415-417)]. It is as if relatives are allowed to cry, though this may cause a degree of 
discomfort for Ian, and the benefits of this expression are embraced. He recognises that 
‘…it’s a two it’s more than one person affected’ [I.418], alluding to the notion that, 
although one person may ‘feel the feelings’, this is not to suggest that those in relation 
remain unaffected.   
Summary 
This super-ordinate theme has looked at feeling the feelings, not only those 
which arise when working with patients who are dying, but the lived experience of the 
mixed emotional responses. There appear to be emotional rules underwritten in the 
experiences of the participants. What emerged from this super-ordinate theme is a sense 
of an implicit, and at times explicit, experience of who feels and where feelings are felt. 
I was left wondering where the space for emotions was in professionalism and how the 
complexity with which the conflict that arose between the two (situated within an 
either/or position) was managed when working ‘absolutely on the edge of human 
suffering’ [M.503]. The function of not feeling appeared to be protective for some, and a 
necessary requirement for what constituted a good doctor-patient relationship for others. 
I was left with sadness as I briefly accompanied Paul in his journey of coming to terms 
with the inevitable death of his friend. It felt as though he had transgressed the rules of 
emotion laid down by the others, in not only developing a friendship with his patient but 
in his openness of feeling the feelings. The analysis does not cast judgment on the 
processes that all participants appeared to be experiencing in relation to their patients, as 
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all accounts were understood within a holistic and embedded context influenced by my 
own contribution in the co-construction of the interpretations that emerged.  
Super-Ordinate Theme Two: The boundaries between self and other 
Introduction 
The concept of boundaries pervaded each participant’s accounts to varying 
degrees and in various disguises. None used the specific word ‘boundaries’ but it has 
been chosen as a way to reflect the over-arching psychological essence of the 
experiences expressed. There are numerous functions of boundaries, and these can only 
be surmised tentatively based on the researcher’s search for participants’ meaning-
making process. Boundaries were seen as important, bound in rules of what constitutes a 
healthy relationship between doctor and patient but also as a way of delineating self 
from other. Geographical boundaries facilitated an easier switching off process between 
the ‘clinic which is over there and research facility which is over here’ [J.103-104], 
while others highlighted the importance of maintaining a work-life balance. This super-
ordinate theme explores how boundaries were created for participants and the meaning 
of these boundaries in the context of working with patients dying from MND. 
Sub-Ordinate Theme One: ‘Certainly not me’ [J.106] 
 
Boundaries can be seen to enable a wider landscape of relations constituting a 
demarcation between ‘we’ as doctors and ‘them’ as patients. The assignation of the 
pronouns ‘we’ and ‘them’ to doctor and patient appeared throughout the participants’ 
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accounts. This could be seen to enable the separation of self and other. John highlights 
the difference between a family member or himself having MND in contrast to a patient, 
and alludes to the function of this delineation.  
 
And of course the patients…I’m close to them, they are my patients they are not 
my family and certainly not me. If I had MND it would even, it would be 
different. If my mother had MND it would be different. But they have it and it’s 
slightly more distant. [J.104-110]  
 
He appears certain of the difference between him and his patients, and his 
reference to ‘they have it’ suggests that the difference centres on those who have the 
disease and those who do not. John mentions the closeness he has towards his patients, 
though it is presented with the contrasting image of distance that is enabled by their 
disease. When asked how this affects his relationship with his patients, John answers ‘it 
means that I give them time’ [J.113]. Although it would seem that he is referring to the 
time he is able to give in order to communicate with his patients, it may also be that John 
is able to give time in addition to the fact that he does not have MND, which is a life-
shortening disease. The distance between John and his patients’ experience of the 
disease is further reinforced by a geographical distance created by patients’ entry into 
hospice, ‘and then I don’t see them again’ [J.133-134]. In John’s case, the distance 
between self and other appears to be enabled because he does not have MND and his 
patients do. His experience seems to be influenced by the absence of disease in his own 
life-world. This point of difference creates both a distance and a closeness that John 
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expresses, thereby indicating a potential conflict. Similarly, Max attempts to distance 
himself by locating the experience of the disease within the other by explaining, ‘I don’t 
have a personal sense of bereavement for somebody else’s function’ [M.652-653]. Ian is 
also clear in the distinction between the experience of self and other when describing 
what happens when a patient asks him what he would do if it was happening to him.  
 
We never try and put ourselves in their shoes. You learn that really early on. If 
a patient ever says to me what would you do? I say I don’t know…I just won’t 
get drawn in, I say I don’t know. [I.435-436] 
 
The reference to ‘we’ suggests Ian is speaking from a collective position within 
his identification possibly as a doctor, contrasted with the reference to ‘them’. Resisting 
identification with the patient appears to be a rule learned through experience. Putting 
yourself in another person’s shoes is often a way to describe the process of empathy. 
Although Ian appears to have empathy for his patients, there seems to be something 
potentially threatening about the empathic process in which Ian hypothetically imagines 
himself with MND. He firmly says ‘certainly I actively don’t go there, I never think 
what I’d do if it was me’ [I.457-458]. And yet, Ian briefly does go there, hypothesising 
that he ‘might curl up in a corner and give up’ [I.451-452] while also wondering with 
his wife what they would do if either one of them had a condition that required 
adjustments to their house. The embodied expression of curling up mimics the foetal 
position, and possibly refers to how a personal confrontation to the threat of his own 
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mortality would regress him to the stage of being a baby inside the womb, symbolising 
both safety and containment, as well as birth.  
 
Similarly, his wife was ‘not very keen to have those conversations’ [I.466-467] 
which might suggest that Ian is not alone in his reluctance to imagine what it would be 
like to have MND. Furthermore, being drawn in by the patient suggests that the other is 
exerting some force on Ian to engage in a process akin to understanding and sharing the 
feelings of another person. Ian refers several times that he does not ‘actively’ [I.457] go 
there or think about having MND which may indicate that at times he is unable to resist 
the merging of self and other. Nonetheless, he seemed to attempt to manage the 
boundary between self and other by using a conscious dis-engagement with a process of 
empathic identification, for protective purposes. 
Sub-Ordinate Theme Two: ‘You’re never going to know what that’s going to be 
like’ [M. 367-368] 
 
The boundary between self and other did not solely reside between the 
participants and patients, but also between participants and those in their own families. 
Max does not stop working at home, and reflects on this process.  
 
I think that inevitably can begin to shut other people out and I think deep down 
inside, I’ve reflected on this, I suspect that there is a kind of negative mental 
process going on which is that…‘I’m dealing with something difficult, 
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important, and terrible and you’re never going to know what that’s going to be 
like so we’re not going to talk about it’…I don’t get home and say to 
Susan…that I had a terrible clinic today cos I saw a 35 year old woman…with 
two small kids who is going to be dead in a year which happens…um…partly 
because that just would kind of be a fairly common conversation…what is there 
to say? [M.359-376] 
 
The boundary arises due to the difference in experience between Max and his 
wife, as well as his belief in the other’s inability to understand his own personal 
experience. The way in which he speaks directly about dealing with something difficult, 
as though he was speaking to his wife, felt like something he had not voiced before. It 
may have been a communication and bid to connect across the boundary upon which 
side he had shut others out and had been left with ‘something difficult, important, and 
terrible’. The way in which he deals with the inability of the other to understand his 
experience is by not talking about it and questioning what the purpose of these 
conversations would hold; ‘I don't see…that she is there to kind of neutralise the horror 
of my clinic or that there would fundamentally be that much point’ [M.381-382]. He 
shares with me just one example of what a ‘terrible clinic’ consists of and ends by 
asking ‘what is there to say?’. What does one say when faced with the knowledge that a 
woman before you with two children will be dead in a year? The answer appears to be 
beyond expression. The powerful anecdote offers a glimpse into the horror that Max is 
faced with, though it is dismissed as a ‘fairly common conversation’, a way in which 
Max possibly attempts to neutralise this horror for himself.  
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Similarly, John discusses the way in which others do not ‘appreciate the disease’ 
[J.424-425]. He describes how he has several colleagues that he invites to his clinic and 
to dinner at his house to discuss science. Although they do not need nor want to ‘switch 
off’ [J.62] when it comes to discussing science, it appears that there is a distance 
between John and the others in his team in regards to their lack of insight into the 
emotional experience they do not share with John.  
 
Emotionally, they don’t know. They don’t see patients, I’m the only clinician in 
the team. I’ve brought them over to the clinic once or twice to have a look…but 
they don’t fully appreciate it. That doesn’t matter. [J.387-392]  
 
Like Max, John dismisses the significance of this lack of understanding. The 
scientists in the rest of his team avoid the clinic, as John describes further how ‘they 
don’t really want to come back to clinic over and over…they’ve seen it and they’ve 
experienced it um I’m going to see the patient develop and deteriorate, ultimately, and 
get that dead letter’ [J.407-412]. Though he states that they experience the clinic, it is as 
if they experience it temporarily, whereas John seems to be left with little choice but to 
witness the patient’s deterioration, and ultimately, their death. There is a sense of 
isolation in which John is potentially left with. Max referred to the importance of not 
regarding his work as a ‘lone ranger scenario’ [M.275], however this image resonated 
with my experience of John’s making sense of his role as the only clinician in the team.  
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Both Max and John have discussed the inability of the other to understand their 
experience, which left me questioning the extent to which I, as a researcher, could 
attempt to make sense of their experience. I was never going to be able to experience 
what it was like for Max to hear the stories of a dying woman or what it was like for 
John to receive a ‘dead letter’ [J.412]. The position of myself as researcher using IPA 
itself does not claim to be able to do this, and I am confined by my own boundaries as a 
person limited to making sense of another’s sense-making process. However, the sense 
of both Max and John being surrounded by others and yet feeling or being alone  reflects 
themes of existential isolation to a certain extent. This may be experienced as part of the 
human experience, but might also be a way in which participants protect their families 
from the emotional impact of their work.  
Sub-Ordinate Theme Three: ‘It’s not happening to me but it could’ [M.762-763] 
 
Thus far, boundaries have emerged as a way to delineate the different 
experiences of self and other, as well as a way in which boundaries may be set by virtue 
of the inability of the other to understand the lived experience of the self. However, Max 
himself states the contradiction he brings by later reflecting that ‘it’s not happening to 
me but it could. It contradicts slightly what I said earlier’ [M.762-764]. Although 
participants like Max, John, and Ian have previously outlined the difference that lies 
between themselves as doctors and the experience that resides within the patient, Max 
suggests that, though there is this difference, it also holds the possibility of similarity. 
While there might be a degree of threat for Ian in putting himself in the shoes of the 
other, Max is clear that what he sees in the clinic is not ‘personally threatening to [him] 
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in any way’ [M.454-455]. What does appear threatening to Max is disease generally, and 
death itself. 
 
…Everything’s going perfectly well and this hammer of fate descends on them 
so that tells me that your sense of personal integrity is tied up with your 
biography and then when that changes it threatens ‘the self’. It tells me that 
anything bad could happen to anyone at any one time. I could get on my bike 
this evening, be knocked off and be tetraplegic…[M.715-723] 
 
There is a quality of randomness to the ‘hammer of fate’ that impacts a person’s 
biography and identity as ‘a self’. Disease and death are indiscriminate in where and 
when it happens. Max does not appear to identify with his patients’ experiences of MND 
but he is able to identify from a position as a human being, vulnerable to the same 
existential touchstones. He is aware of his personal biography surrounding disease in 
regards to heart disease as he states it is statistically more common in his family, ‘so I’m 
not expecting to get motor neurone disease…I’m expecting to get heart disease at some 
point’ [M.450-453]. His observation of the statistical chances of what disease he could 
contract in the future suggests an attempt to make sense and possibly obtain a degree of 
control over the ‘hammer of fate’ that descends. However, this conflict is accompanied 
with uncertainty that although Max may experience heart disease, he could also be 
knocked off his bike and become disabled in some other way. When Max refers to what 
‘it tells me’, there is a sense that he is drawing lessons or receiving feedback from his 
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experience of working with patients, which suggests a dynamic inter-relatedness 
between Max and the world he is embedded in.  
For John, this quality of randomness appears to be made sense of by becoming a 
relative phenomenon. He talks about how it is confusing and difficult for his patients 
when faced with a diagnosis of MND, and I wonder with him whether he may find it 
difficult. He responds initially with how it motivates him to do further research but also 
that, ‘it’s unfortunate, stuff happens all the time, people get blown to smithereens in 
other parts of the world’ [J.332-335]. The war-like imagery creates a sense of death as 
violent, while the reference to others could be seen as a move away from staying with 
any potential personal sense of difficulty; it’s bad, but others have it worse.  
 Max takes ownership of a different narrative around disease, while Peter hints at 
a degree of potential anxiety surrounding the possibility of developing MND himself. He 
refers to times when he has been running and become potentially hyper-vigilant of 
physical sensations.  
 
I think…anyone working in this sort of field has they notice things on their own 
body maybe a bit more um and one of the signs in MND are fasciculations, 
which are involuntary muscle twitches, it can happen in the calf, it can happen 
in the hands but they’re also very common in the general population…So I get 
them, my boss gets them and when you’re working in the field…you can 
rationalise it or I can because you know they’re actually normal and there are 
no other features but MND is a very rare disease…but…I would lie if I said you 
didn’t think about some of those things occasionally. [Pe.374-394] 
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It is as if Peter enters the initial stages of appraising certain physical sensations. 
He has a choice of attributing the muscle twitches he experiences after running to the 
onset of MND or to an understandable, disease-free, and ‘normal’ physical reaction. 
Although he is able to rationalise these symptoms, he admits that he may have fearful 
thoughts regarding the possibility that he could have MND, though he does not 
explicitly articulate this. Fasciculations become a point of similarity, which connect 
those with MND to those in the general population. The boundary between having MND 
and not becomes less discernible in the moments when Peter is able to imagine briefly 
the embodied experience of what it might be like to have MND.  
Sub-Ordinate Theme Four: A healthy doctor-patient relationship 
 
The boundaries inherent in a doctor-patient relationship emerged from several 
participants’ accounts. This relationship has been discussed previously in regards to 
emotions and the implicit rules governing the role of emotions within the doctor-patient 
relationship. This sub-theme focuses on ways in which participants make sense of this 
relationship in regards to the boundaries embedded in the identities of doctor and 
patient. Max discusses the ways in which these boundaries can be transgressed. He uses 
the example of the development of sexual relationships to demonstrate his struggle with 
understanding how infringements can occur amidst the boundaries delineated. 
 
…It’s not about being distant and cold it’s about understanding the context 
here. It’s like many things in medicine, why do people get in trouble with the 
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general medical council for sleeping with their patients…for me this is a 
professional encounter, it’s not a social one. So it’s never occurred to me that I 
would ever be in danger from an attractive person coming into my clinic with a 
problem, because the context of it is so fundamentally different from normal 
social interaction and it’s true also of their human misery because I’m a 
professional trying to help, it is absolutely not about me. [M.532-542] 
 
The encounter becomes defined as professional, rather than social, as these terms 
acquire a binary status, oppositional on either polarity of human relations. The split may 
be so effective that Max suggests that he has not even considered the way in which the 
social encounter could interact with the professional. It is noteworthy that for Max, a 
social encounter is described in a potentially extreme scenario of a sexual relationship 
developing between doctor and patient, which suggests that such is the nature of the 
transgression inherent when a professional encounter becomes social. The context he 
works in appears to be one of a degree of alienation as it is described in terms of such 
fundamental difference to ‘normal social interaction’. A patient’s ‘human misery’ 
becomes separated from the confines of normality, although it could be argued that 
death is a fundamental part of what it means to be human. Instead Max identifies himself 
as a helping professional rather than as a human Being-in-the-world relating to a misery 
that transcends the boundaries of doctor and patient. However, the meaning of 
transcending the boundaries delineated by professional and patient becomes as intimate, 
and as forbidden, as a sexual relationship. There may be also an ethical underpinning to 
his understanding as a result of the comparison he chooses to offer. Ian echoes parts of 
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Max’s conceptualisation of the doctor-patient relationship, albeit adopting a both/and 
position. 
 
I think that you can make somebody feel important, special, looked after, you 
don’t have to become their best friend, and actually I think that’s dysfunctional 
if you try to. [I.314-317]  
 
Ian alludes to a function that the relationship between doctors and patients may 
have. His suggestion that becoming friends would be dysfunctional indicates that this 
type of relationship would no longer be able to operate properly. Thus, the delineation of 
the doctor-patient relationship as being outside the realm of ‘normal social interaction’ 
[M.538-539] serves a potentially functional purpose. These may be many and one can 
only surmise in the absence of Max and Ian’s further explication. One function may be 
to protect some of the participants from the intimacy of the relationship between doctor 
and patient, protected behind boundaries of institutionalised roles that can keep 
participants safe from experiencing the full loss and ‘human misery’ that threatens to 
overwhelm if eclipsed. However, challenges may arise when attempting to connect to 
the other in the midst of confronting mortality and all its humanity on a doctor to patient 
basis, alienated from human to human inter-relatedness. Ian appears to believe that both 
modes of relating are compatible, while Brian refers to the threat present to the ‘heart 
of…dealing with the person, who I’m used to calling a patient’ [B.291-292]. Thus, what 
constituted a healthy doctor-patient relationship held different meanings for participants, 
reflecting various ways of being with self and other. 
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Summary 
The boundaries between self and other were explored in relation to participants’ 
processes of creating demarcations in various ways. John and Max appeared to make 
sense of working with patients dying with MND by conceptualising their sense of self in 
the absence of MND as a personal disease experience. Furthermore, this detached sense 
of self was reinforced by an attachment to the identity of doctor and the implications for 
what constituted a healthy doctor-patient relationship. This appeared to be challenged 
when some participants brought in their awareness of their own mortality, which may 
have transcended the boundaries created.  
Super-Ordinate Theme Three: ‘People die’ [J.146] 
Introduction  
Knowledge was identified as an important part of participants’ experiences when 
working with patients diagnosed with MND. This involved an understanding of 
mortality as an existential fact, encapsulated by John’s statement, ‘people die’ [J.146]. 
Others expressed the ways in which MND as a disease challenged the knowledge and 
certainty that participants held. In addition, they spoke of what it meant to have 
knowledge and expertise in relation to MND, as well as the challenges that arose when 
working with a terminal disease. This super-ordinate theme examines the way in which 
knowledge of death creates meaning while also enabling action and certainty amidst an 
incurable disease fraught with uncertainty. 
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Sub-Ordinate Theme One: The facts of life 
 
Participants expanded upon what it means to work with people who are dying, and their 
relationship to bearing witness to this process. This suggests an observing stance, 
positioned on the outside at a distance while at the same time connected to the process 
unfolding before them. For John, it is plausible that an aspect of his experience of 
patients dying may be related to an understandable and knowable part of life, becoming 
the facts of life; ‘people die’ [J.146]. John was asked what it was like to receive a ‘dead 
letter’ [J.412]. 
 
It’s a bit of a shock but you know, we will have discussions with other team 
members and they’ll inform me that someone’s gone in and they’ve gotten sick 
and stuff like that. It’s…again…you know, people die. [J.142-146] 
 
The shock appears to be minimised to a certain extent by becoming ‘a bit of a 
shock’, while there may be a distance between John and the death of his patient, enabled 
by the communication of their team. The patient’s death becomes spoken of in 
euphemisms, and contrasts with the starkness of the ‘dead letter’ referred to earlier. 
When John describes it as ‘again…you know, people die’ [J.146], it is spoken as if I (the 
researcher) am not fully aware of these facts of life that must be repeated again. When 
asked how he coped with these deaths, prompted by my own curiosity regarding the 
shock he initially describes, John states that, ‘there was no problem. People die, you 
know. I accept it, it doesn’t take long for me to accept the bad news’ [J.158-156]. 
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Knowing the facts of life appears to enable acceptance, as it may be easier to accept 
concrete know-able facts held in one’s own control rather than experiencing what it 
might be like to be in a position where participants themselves are kept at a distance 
from patients’ deaths. John talks about participants entering hospice and ‘then I don’t 
see them again’ [J.133-134], Peter refers to not being ‘privy to everything’ [Pe.463], and 
Paul describes not seeing patients again, as well as their families, with whom he has 
developed their own unique relationship.  
Therefore, there is a sense that though ‘people die’ in accordance with the facts 
of life, some of the participants are removed from experiencing the end of their 
relationship with patients. Their death is ‘bad news’ for John, which resonated with the 
way in which diagnoses such as MND are referred to ‘bad news’ for patients themselves 
to accept. There is an interpersonal connection, and as ‘people die’ so will John. I 
wondered whether the extent to which he was able to accept his patients’ death and the 
way in which he may have made sense of their death as fact, extended to his own 
mortality. The use of the third person when referring to ‘people die’ includes himself as 
a position but also provides a sense of distance from it.  
Parts of Brian’s account resonated with John’s as he asserts, ‘you’re alive until 
you’re dead…just to state the obvious’ [B.341-342]. However, the facts of life appear to 
be significant for Brian to the extent to which it informs the way in which a patient is 
treated with dignity, in life and beyond death in regards to supporting family members. 
Thus, it is not only their death that is a fact, but that they are alive until they are dead 
which appears to inform his approach to working with patients. In relation to his 
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relationship to his own mortality, he refers to the way in which he does not worry about 
having death ‘never…very far from the front of your mind’ [B.378]. 
 
…It’s two things really, the one is the rational bit of me says it is only rational 
to recognise my own more or less impending mortality so I might be forty years 
from the end of my life for all I know but that is still not a very long time, for all 
I know I might be five minutes away just don’t know um…it’s sensible and 
rational and reasonable to recognise that fact, not to live with your life 
dominated by it but to recognise it, there’s no threat involved in that that isn’t 
already there anyway so if I pretended it wasn’t so it wouldn’t change that fact 
at all. That’s the sort of rational bit of me. [B.377-393] 
 
Brian refers to the meaning of understanding the fact of his own mortality, 
recognising it as a fact that has an impact in his life to the extent that it is something to 
be acknowledged rather than dominated by. To be dominated by this awareness appears 
to be equated with threat, and possibly a lack of power and risk that Brian reflects is 
already present. Brian refers to the futility of denying his mortality for it is bound in 
irrefutable truth. However, Brian describes the rational part of himself, implying the 
presence of other parts that stand alongside the ‘rational bit’ [B.382]. These other parts 
may relate to the uncertainty of when he will die. Brian identifies himself as a Christian 
and talks about his own faith that involves ‘believing a set of things’ [B.397] about life, 
death, and immortality. These could be considered a set of facts that belong to his 
religion and which informs his own relationship to mortality. 
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…[It] gives a confidence…a sense that ok I’m here for a purpose, I don’t expect 
my life is going to end any time soon but when it does, two really important 
things, one that timing is firmly in God’s hands absolutely sure about that, 
nothing there’s no risk that sits outside his perfect plan, that’s really um 
reassuring in a way cos it’s a much better plan than I might could have put 
together and secondly that my eternity is then secure. [B.400.408]  
 
The set of rules he believes in appears to provide the framework upon which a 
sense of purpose is built on. He states the two things he ‘knows’, centering around the 
knowledge that though there is uncertainty regarding the time of his death, he has 
renounced certainty to God who will decide his fate. The threat previously referred to is 
further mitigated by the existence of a ‘perfect plan’. The potential certainty enshrined 
in this plan may contribute to the reassurance Brian describes. Brian does not need to 
wrestle with the possible lack of control and uncertainty that accompanies the time of 
death and the plan that unfolds beforehand because it is placed within the control of a 
higher being. 
Furthermore, the possibility of death itself no longer becomes something 
experienced as a potential end, but as a temporal event on the limitless timeline of 
eternity. Brian believes that the ‘rational doctor’s recognition that death happens’ 
[B.410-411] sits alongside his belief in eternal life, as it appears he engages in a process 
of managing his awareness of mortality, ‘never very far from the front of my mind, not 
traumatised by it, not dominated by it…getting on with the things that I can do and find 
value in here and now’ [B.412-415]. The potential for being overwhelmed by the 
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knowledge of his mortality appears to exist, though doing the things Brian can do and 
finding value in the present may represent a way in which he manages this tension. This 
is similar to the ‘checks and balances’ [I.52] Ian refers to previously. This raises the 
possibility of knowledge as potentially dangerous, reminiscent of the apple plucked from 
the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden.  
 
Sub-Ordinate Theme Two: ‘Watching life swivel on a sixpence’ [P.220-221] 
 
The certainty that appears to accompany the facts of life is not representative of 
all participants’ experiences of working with people dying from MND. Although there 
may be a degree of certainty regarding death, the intersection with the disease itself 
seems to transform the experience into one of change and uncontrollable uncertainty. In 
regards to change, Paul discusses the impact of his work on how he approaches life. 
 
…The watching life swivel on a sixpence…I’ve watched several people, they’re 
planning their lives and then suddenly they’ve got motor neurone disease and 
it’s rapidly progressive and they’re dead within a year um you know, making 
you think you’ve got you’ve got to be happy with life right now, you can’t 
always be thinking ahh I’ll be happy with life in time or you know or I’ll just do 
this this and this and then it’ll be ok. You’ve got to be sure that you’re doing the 
right things now and that if if something devastating happened tomorrow that 
you haven’t just put off stuff. [P.220-234] 
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The watching of life change resonates with Ian’s feeling of it being ‘unbearable 
to watch’ [I.385] though Paul seems to expand on the way in which his position as 
observer impacts the way in which he is living his life. It is almost as if there are rules 
that come to govern his life, reflected in his statement ‘you’ve got to be happy’, as well 
as a sense of urgency in being happy ‘with life right now’. Life does not become 
something lived in the future, but unfolds in the present accompanied by a mandate that 
one needs to do the ‘right things now’ [P.232]. The looming possibility of devastation 
tomorrow combined with the seemingly precarious swiveling of life contributes to a 
sense of urgency.  
 
…Your life ticks along for so long you think you know you think you know 
where things are going, I can tell you my plan for five years, ten years, etc. etc. 
But you know, next month I might be I might have a bit of twitching in my 
thumb, two months later I might have a diagnosis of motor neurone disease and 
in eighteen months I could be dead you know and…because of that thought 
process, obviously it can happen from any number of things road traffic 
accidents and whatever um but you know just that seeing people… [P.239-253]  
 
Paul seems keenly aware of the temporal dimensions of life, as it ‘ticks along’ 
like a clock. He alludes to the plans he may hold along this dimension, bound in 
certainty of life’s direction. The description of time correspondingly ‘swivels’ as it 
becomes one of Being-towards-death (Heidegger, 1927/2010). His use of the first person 
emphasises the sense that, though he is seeing this process happen in his patients, there 
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is the possibility that he could also share in this experience, particularly in the midst of 
uncertainty. Paul refers to the way in which this dying process happens quickly in a road 
traffic accident, whereas when working with people with motor neurone disease, there 
appears to be the opportunity for Paul to see this process, which contrasts with the 
change evoked in the image of life swiveling. There appears to be an important 
connection in Paul seeing his patients and having the knowledge of the way in which life 
changes. He doesn’t work with people who die in road traffic accidents, however he 
does work with those dying with motor neurone disease. The impact on the way in 
which he lives his life appears to create a sense of urgency in making sure ‘I’m living a 
life that’s worthwhile’ [P.261-262]. It may be that living a purposeful and meaningful 
life becomes one way in which to wrest control over a process with such profound 
consequences, hanging on the balance of the swivel of a sixpence.  
Aspects of this sub-ordinate theme resonate with the previous theme of ‘it’s not 
happening to me but it could’ [M.762-763]. Both Max and Paul talk about the possibility 
of death and disease happening to them, and that the change in their own narratives 
could happen quickly as well as by chance. However, this theme focuses on the 
knowledge of this chance of change rather than the identification of the experience of 
having motor neurone disease transcending the interpersonal boundaries previously 
expanded upon. Furthermore, the question of certainty also appears to contribute to the 
impact of change on some participants’ lives. Max refers to his ‘instant gratification 
phenotype’ [M.726] which suggests that this part is already embedded in his genetic 
make-up rather than a consequence of his work with patients. His behaviour does not 
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appear to be informed by the uncertainty of when he will die, but rather the certainty that 
he will die and the limits this imposes.  
 
…Maybe this predated motor neurone disease, my father and his generation 
never made it to 70, I never thought I was going to live a very long life so I’ve 
always been one to kind of just take the pleasures that are in front of you and 
not delay them. I think that almost certainly MND reinforces that because you 
do see that people’s first thought processes are full of bereavement for what 
was to come. [M.741-750] 
 
For Max, watching his patients dying reinforces his approach to life that 
demonstrates a hedonistic quality firmly located in the present. The speed with which 
the unpredictability of death may fall upon him prompts him to enjoy life in the present 
lest he mourn the loss of the future like his patients might do. Nevertheless, this 
approach appears to be enabled by the certainty inherent in the knowledge that he will 
not live a long life.  
Sub-Ordinate Theme Three: Being an expert 
 
Thus far knowledge has been discussed in relation to mortality as existential fact, 
however knowledge as an entity in itself arose in participants’ accounts. Being an expert 
suggested an imbalance of power in an asymmetrical relationship between doctor and 
patient. Being an expert implied control and certainty in the possession of knowledge. 
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Max discusses the way in which the doctor-patient relationship is ‘massively 
asymmetrical’ [M.832] which appears to be framed as being enabled by the position of 
the patient as vulnerable when ill, a position that Max acknowledges ‘we’ve all been in’ 
[M.829]. This reinforces a sense of interpersonal connection reflected in their shared 
vulnerability. This demonstrate the potential ways in which asymmetry is characteristic 
of the doctor-patient relationship rather than the relationship between two human beings. 
Nevertheless Max describes the way in which this asymmetry manifests itself in his 
position as expert. 
 
I’m the person with the power and the knowledge with life-changing sentences 
and so you know, it’s all about how I’d conduct myself and do that, whether it’s 
done well or not. It’s a question of professional expertise... [M.832-837] 
 
Both power and knowledge seem to confer Max with ‘life-changing sentences’ 
[M.834]. This implies an immense power to be able to change someone’s life, which 
appears to create a degree of pressure in which Max must then conduct himself well and 
cultivate his professional expertise. He further illuminates what it means to have this 
power and knowledge.  
 
…It does mean that I have to feel completely in control so I think I have…got 
the knowledge and expertise and the certainty which means I’m not going to be 
derailed by what I see in front of me I’m always going to be able to make a 
diagnosis and I’m an expert. Being an expert is very important. You know, I 
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know things that other people don’t know so they send them to me and it’s on 
purpose. [M.839-848] 
 
Being an expert could provide Max with an element of control, but control also 
appears to be described as a necessary part of being an expert. This may be undermined 
by the lack of a cure for MND. His knowledge, expertise, and certainty becomes similar 
to train tracks setting his course, preventing him from being ‘derailed’ by what he is 
presented with in the other. There does not seem to be any room for uncertainty, doubt, 
or not-knowing, for it is inextricably linked with being an expert. It may be that not 
having the knowledge to make a diagnosis strips him of his professional expertise, 
exposing something potentially vulnerable beneath it. The importance Max attributes to 
being an expert suggests there are significant implications bound in this identity and a 
possible fear in what it would mean not to know. He positions himself as in possession 
of knowledge others don’t have, whereby colleagues intentionally send him patients to 
see, which creates the sense of Max and his knowledge having a special status. Being an 
expert thus positions Max as more powerful as a result of his knowledge and certainty, 
within both the relationship he has with patients and the relationship he has within his 
wider medical profession.  
Similarly, Ian describes the way in which his expertise positions himself within 
the doctor-patient relationship. However, he expands on the way in which having greater 
knowledge about MND than his patients results in conversations where he must then 
communicate that knowledge to them. Many patients are sent to Ian because of his 
expertise which thus positions himself as expert even before the encounter of the other. 
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He talks about what it is like talking to people about death and dying when they have 
limited knowledge of the disease. 
 
They don’t know anything, you’re talking to them, let’s make it a perfect storm, 
perhaps fairly limited education, really no idea about most medical things and 
certainly nothing about MND…and of course MND patients don’t feel ill, it’s 
not like cancer, you don’t feel ill, you’ve just got a weak hand, a weak leg…and 
my heart is already sinking and I’m thinking oh man you know I’ve got this 
thing that I’m going to be saying in ten minutes time when we’ve gone through 
the charade of examining them because I don’t necessarily need to but I will 
because they’ve said they’ve come for a second opinion…they’ve just come to 
see an expert…um and I’ve got this terrible terrible feeling that we’re marching 
towards this moment and so it weighs heavily and I’m thinking I just need to be 
mindful could they fall on the floor… [I.1077-1096] 
 
The reference to a ‘perfect storm’ demonstrates a contradiction in terms between 
the organised ideal of perfection and the chaos-ridden turmoil of a storm. They are rare 
phenomena that aggravate the circumstances of the event. Nevertheless this may reflect 
the way in which Ian experience this particular encounter, whereby these particular 
patients have no knowledge thus leaving him to manage the turmoil of this ‘storm’ 
himself. It is almost as if patients who have limited knowledge are in a blissful 
ignorance as Ian sits and waits for what is to come. The reference to ‘knowledge’ 
encompasses a variety of types of knowing. Ian’s knowledge might include ‘most 
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medical things’ and involve a scientific understanding of MND, but patients might have 
a different type of knowledge that involves what is like to have MND within their own 
lived experience. Nonetheless, Ian appears to refer to their initial lack of knowledge 
about the lived experience of illness, as the symptoms of MND do not manifest in a way 
in which an embodied knowledge would be acquired. He describes his heart sinking 
which suggests the weight and potential burden he holds in the knowledge of their 
diagnosis. He performs the ‘charade of examining them’ demonstrating the implied 
performative function of the examination that further reinforces his status of expert.  
Ian appears to experience some difficulty emotionally as he emphasises the 
terrible feeling, by repeating the word ‘terrible’, similar to the conceivable dread of 
anticipation before marching into battle. The weight of what appears to be the 
knowledge he will have to share and the accompanying feeling, lends itself to the 
imagery of heavy marching. It is as though in his awareness of his patients’ potential 
physical collapse, he has transferred the weight of this knowledge to his patients, an 
unbearable weight that threatens collapse, both physical and psychic. Furthermore, 
marching implies an unstoppable movement towards a terrible fate that Ian is in 
possession of handing over. Ian reports that sometimes he makes the decision to wait for 
the patient to bring someone else to the consultation, and I was left wondering whether 
this may have provided a further function of supporting Ian.   
 
‘They’re the worst and it’s not very often, totally unexpected, you know no way 
they thought they were leaving the room with the news you’re about to give them 
and you know that’s coming and that’s horrible’ [I.1130-1134].  
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Ian gives them the news and they leave the room with it, which raises questions 
about what Ian is left with. The transfer of this knowledge that Ian presumes patients do 
not want (specifically a diagnosis of MND) appears to create a sense of dread for Ian as 
he anticipates the future. It may be that this dread is a result of the conflict between his 
position as expert, and as communicator of the knowledge involved in that position, that 
has life-changing consequences for the other in the encounter.  
 Ian and Max describe their experience of communicating diagnoses to patients 
from a position of expert. However, not all participants appeared to perceive their role as 
that of an expert. Peter describes the way in which he positions professors as having the 
expertise, ‘when patients come to clinic, they expect to see the professor who’s got 
decades of experience’ [Pe.132-134]. This has implications for his relationship with 
professors as he becomes positioned with less expertise, and potentially less power in a 
place of un-knowing that he admits may be uncomfortable. He states that ‘it really did 
impact on me that what if I didn’t know the answer to a question…’ [Pe.146-147]. The 
use of the past tense suggests that there has been a temporal development in his 
knowledge. Nonetheless, he describes being open and transparent with his patients about 
the need to ‘bring the professor in because obviously it’s a learning game for us as well’ 
[Pe.142-143]. Being an expert is thus conflated with teaching, of which both Peter and 
his patient receive. His transparency in his position of not-knowing might create distress 
to a certain extent but it also highlights a potential difference to Ian’s experience, 
whereby Peter’s withdrawal from an expert position (placed with his professors) may 
mitigate the sense of dread in the conflict that Ian describes previously.  
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 Peter locates expertise with his professors, Ian grapples with the position 
involved in communicating his expertise, while Max experiences the power and 
knowledge inherent in his position as part of his expertise and professional 
responsibility. John does not explicitly link his knowledge to being an expert however, 
there are elements of his narrative which suggest that he holds a degree of expertise that 
is attractive to others. He describes how ‘people have phoned me up and I’ve met them 
up at talks, they’ve come up to me about what I’m doing, want to be a part of the team’ 
[J.227-229]. There is a sense that he is a big fish in a small pond as he talks about 
‘looking to try and move…to a bigger institute because this isn’t big enough’ [J.234-
235]. Thus, his expertise and knowledge may confer a degree of status and power that 
has an impact on the interpersonal relations within his team and wider social system. 
Conversely, Paul’s expertise positions himself among his patients as a way in which he 
connects his patients to each other, as well as the varied knowledge they all hold as a 
disconnected whole.  
 
‘…As a motor neurone disease clinician [laughs] often what you are is a 
conduit for people to talk to each other because you know something that works 
for somebody might work for somebody else…and actually although I can say 
you know I’ve got a lot of experience my experience mainly comes from 
talking…working with people who have the disease um if you could put 
everybody with motor neurone disease in a room you wouldn’t need a lot of the 
things I do, some of the things you’d still need but other things you wouldn’t 
need’ [P.602-615] 
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He appears to reflect on the meaning of his position as expert based on the 
experience he has, while also suggesting that parts of his role would become redundant 
if patients were able to share their knowledge amongst each other. Paul describes the 
obstacles as concerning issues of confidentiality and the technicalities involved in 
patients meeting up, though he reports ways in which they are developing patient forums 
to facilitate this process. Thus, Paul becomes a channel through which to allow his 
patients to connect indirectly, while also facilitating spaces to enable this. However, Paul 
appears to diminish his role and renounce his expert position, which contributes to a 
sense that he instills the role of expertise and knowledge in his patients. Knowledge has 
been explored in relation to what it means to be an expert, the meaning of the facts of 
life bound in certainty, as well as the contrast with the challenge of this certainty posed 
by bearing witness to life changing in the ‘swivel of a sixpence’ [P.221]. 
Sub-Ordinate Theme Four: ‘All doom and gloom’ [Pe.191] 
 
‘All doom and gloom’ explores the meaning of research and knowledge in the 
pursuit of managing the difficulties associated with MND. Peter describes the supportive 
measures that doctors can put in place for patients, as well as using medications to treat 
symptoms.  
 
 So we try and concentrate on those elements rather than think of the disease, 
you know all doom and gloom. I think it can be really hard to rationalise in 
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your mind because clearly these patients have a very limited life expectancy. 
[Pe.189-194] 
 
MND is currently an incurable disease, and in the absence of being able to treat 
the disease it appears that Peter has sought to create a space for medical intervention 
nonetheless. This may be part of what he considers a doctor’s role but it could also be a 
product of the tension that he seems to highlight. On one hand, he makes an active 
decision to concentrate on what he can do, rather than being-with the disease, which he 
describes as ‘all doom and gloom’. On the other hand, he is aware of a process, a 
‘making-sense of’ on a cognitive level that ‘those elements’ are in conflict with the 
nature of the disease. There is a momentary glimpse into the potential struggle with the 
‘doom and gloom’ of MND as a disease. However, Peter reflects a sense of temporal 
understanding of the death of his patients. 
 
The general trend over thirty or forty years is for improvement then I think you 
can have a positive feeling about it all despite the fact that patients are dying 
along the way because if we weren’t doing everything we were in the research 
field, those patients would still die and probably many more would um and in 
ten years’ time you’d be further along than you were right now so I think we 
are all making a positive impact, it’s just the time scales are not aligned. 
[Pe.535-546] 
 
 88 
Thus, research itself becomes a way in which to potentially manage the challenge 
that though Peter and other participants are engaged in research that may not cure 
current patients of their disease, their research transcends the boundaries of even their 
own life spans to ‘further our knowledge for future generations’ [Pe.559-560]. Research 
appears to represent a similar role for patients themselves, from the perspective of 
participants, in regards to patient contributions to research. Peter honestly acknowledges 
to his patients that their contributions to research are unlikely to help them, however he 
believes that patients find benefit in the knowledge that future generations who may 
inherit MND could benefit from the research. Peter refers to the ‘legacy’ [Pe.967] that 
patients leave behind in the data contributed to research, which suggests that both patient 
and doctor are engaged in an endeavor invoking Becker’s (1973) ‘immortality project’. 
Seeking transcendence in a belief-system beyond the constraints of a physical reality 
subject to mortal disease may be one response to being-with death and dying, for both 
participants and their patients.  
 
Paul reinforces the concept of ‘doom and gloom’ by describing the nature of 
MND in greater detail. 
 
MND is a horrible disease er my boss Lauren calls it the worst disease in 
medicine…it’s relatively common, one in four hundred people, it’s incurable 
and it’s nasty and it tends to affect people out of nowhere, they’re not they’re 
not these are often very well, very high functioning, often just retired, planning 
the rest of their lives and then they’re sort of er you know something happens, 
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there’s a bit of weakness and then in a couple of months, they’re sat in clinic 
talking to me or to Lauren. [P.51-63] 
 
The progression of the disease is prominent as well as its indiscriminate quality. 
There appears to be a momentum to the disease, as it ends abruptly with the image of the 
patient sitting in a clinic with the participant, almost as if Paul himself represents the 
end, or possibly the beginning of a journey into the ‘doom and gloom’. However, Paul 
expands on how one of the motivations for working in the field of MND is that,  
 
…There are a lot things that make it an attractive research target and also if we 
can make significant headway in motor neurone disease I think it will have a 
knock-on for other diseases, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s as well so there’s sort of 
a broader reign there as well…[P.70-74] 
 
Therefore, despite the ‘horrible disease’ Paul describes, there appears to be a paradox to 
the attractive quality that does create opportunity for progression in regards to research 
development. This is echoed in John’s statement describing MND as ‘a nasty disease 
and a really interesting disease’ [J.238-239]. Moreover, research not only enables Paul 
to ‘make significant headway’ in MND but also creates opportunities to influence other 
areas within the field of neurodegenerative diseases. This ‘broader reign’ may facilitate 
the process of ‘doing’ rather than staying with the potential difficulties in MND 
specifically. John describes the progress of his research shortly after being asked what 
effect this type of work has had on how he thinks about life and death.  
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…Everything’s working. Most of the time research 90% doesn’t work and 10% 
of it does. It’s the other way round, everything seems to be working. You never 
know when this is going to end. What I think that means is that we are on the 
right path. [J.218-223] 
 
The conviction with which John relays the state of research challenged an 
assumption I had held in regards to the field of MND. One of the pre-dominant features 
of MND that had remained with me throughout the research process was its incurable 
nature. Brian himself refers to the field as a ‘data-free zone’ [B.1090-1091]. However, 
John describes the way in which ‘everything’s working’. This may indicate a divergence 
in what ‘working’ means to John and what it means to me, as well as potentially to 
patients. John’s conviction is contrasted by the uncertainty he describes in regards to 
understanding how genes cause MND as well as explaining how ‘that doubt coupled 
with my interest in the phenomenon of being paralysed but still being able to see and 
feel led me to do research in this area’ [J.250-253]. His reference to his interest in the 
phenomenon creates a sense of intellectual distance that adopts an observer position, 
whilst also perhaps mirroring some of his own sense of being paralysed in the midst of 
the doubt and uncertainty he offers glimpses of. This also resonated with the 
researcher’s own endeavor of phenomenological inquiry into John’s experience. 
The similarities between the descriptions of MND by Paul, Peter, and John 
appear to be in regards to the relationship between being-with the difficulty of MND as a 
disease and the role of research or medical knowledge as an opportunity for doing. The 
latter may be a response to the challenges of being-with the uncertainty and the ‘doom 
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and gloom’ of MND. However, being-with and doing-to do not necessarily exist as an 
either/or relationship, as Brian suggests that, 
 
…You can’t make it good, I don’t think living with MND is going to be good, 
but you can certainly make it less bad and you can help someone find, you can’t 
do this to people, I think to patients and family, you can help them, support 
them through the processing of finding what is good in it. [B.143-149] 
 
For Brian, making a difference does not necessarily occur as a result of research, 
while for other participants such as Paul, John, and Peter, research adopts a different 
meaning in the context of doing. What they share is a complex relationship to the ‘doom 
and gloom’ that may form part of their experience in working with patients with MND.  
Summary 
This super-ordinate theme has examined participants’ experience of the 
knowledge that their patients will die, and how they themselves as human beings will 
eventually share in this universal experience of mortality. Watching their patients’ lives 
change dramatically challenged the certainty explored in the sub-ordinate theme of ‘The 
facts of life’, by introducing uncertainty and chance. Knowledge was seen to confer 
expertise and power, enshrined in what it meant to ‘Being an expert’.  
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Discussion 
The analysis focused on participants’ experiences and meaning-making 
processes that represent the phenomenological aspects of IPA. This also involves 
acknowledging the role of the researcher in the co-construction of knowledge. 
Interpretations and subsequent analysis were grounded within the participants’ data, and 
supported with evidence using data extracts to offer an open and transparent account of 
the analytic journey. Reflexivity was used and accounted for throughout (Appendix L-
N) to locate the researcher’s own position in relation to the phenomenon and the 
experience of “making sense of participants trying to make sense of their world” (Smith 
& Osborn, 2015, p.26), in this case the world of working with patients with motor 
neurone disease. The discussion that follows will focus on the researcher’s 
interpretations that extend beyond the data, locating these in relation to the existing 
research and theoretical landscape. The sections outlined represent broad areas of 
interest which have been categorised in the context of the findings of the study and 
previous research.  
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Terror management 
 
Three days and three nights of horrible suffering, and then death. Just think, it 
could happen to me any time now, he thought, and he felt that momentary pang of 
fear. But immediately he was saved, without knowing how, by the old familiar idea 
that this had happened to Ivan Ilyich, not him, and it could not and would not 
happen to him, and that kind of thinking would put him in a gloomy mood, for 
which there was no need, as Schwartz’s face had clearly demonstrated. Pursuing 
this line of thought, Pyotr Ivanovich calmed down and began to show a close 
interest in the details of Ivan Ilyich’s death, as if death was a chance experience 
that may have applied to Ivan Ilyich but certainly didn’t apply to him. (Tolstoy, 
1886/2010, pg.11) 
 
Despite an existential awareness presented by participants, scholars such as Becker 
(1973) posit that a denial of death is necessary in order to live, arising out of the conflict 
between an awareness of death and the drive for self-preservation. Human beings must 
contend with a “world so full of beauty, majesty, and terror that if animals perceived it 
all they would be paralysed to act” (Becker, 1973, p.50). Managing this uniquely human 
consciousness of death can result in various forms of denial. The quote from Tolstoy’s 
(1886/2010) Death of Ivan Illyich illustrates one way in which a person’s death affects 
those around them. Pyotr Ivanovich watches as his friend dies and is momentarily struck 
by a fear of his own death. He is quickly reassured by the conviction that Ivan Ilyich is 
the one who will die, thus saving him from his own mortal fate. Death becomes a chance 
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experience that has befallen the other. This quote was chosen as it resonated with themes 
that emerged from participants’ experiences of working with dying patients. 
‘It’s not happening to me, but it could’ [M.762-763] summarises the tensions, 
which were highlighted in managing the existential impact of participants’ work. In 
addition, the curious fascination Pyotr has with the details of Ivan Ilyich’s death echoed 
the way in which participants approached their research into MND and their fascination 
of ‘a nasty disease and a really interesting disease’ [J.238-239]. However, 
understanding death as explicated in the sub-theme ‘The facts of life’ could also be 
considered neutral death acceptance, whereby death is faced in a rational manner, 
regarded as an inevitable end (Wong & Tomer, 2011). It has been argued that those who 
enter the medical profession are motivated by a need to manage their own death anxiety 
(Feifel & Branscomb, 1973). The role of curing or saving patients may assuage fears and 
provide a sense of control over death (Kasket, 2006; Wahl, 1969). Various defenses 
have been identified in managing this ‘terror’, one of which might be intellectualisation, 
providing a level of detachment that is effective as well as valued in the medical 
profession (Kasket, 2006). Most of the participants were involved in research and 
discussed this aspect of their work in depth throughout the interviews.  
Research could be seen to provide meaning and purpose, but it may have also been 
a way in which participants managed some of the issues raised in regards to working 
with death and dying. A notable image is that of Paul as he traced a circle with his 
fingers when describing how he manages the anticipation of his friend’s death. The 
circle demonstrates the feedback mechanism that may occur on a personal level in 
addition to an institutionalised learning structure that reinforces a gradual emotional 
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detachment and avoidance (Wear, 2002). However, Paul did not appear emotionally 
detached as he brought emotion into the interview itself. This could have been as a result 
of the emotional space that may have opened up when talking not only to a researcher, 
but to someone from the therapeutic profession. Nevertheless, there was a suppressed 
quality to Paul’s voice, imbued with emotion struggling to come out, enough so that I 
was moved to ask whether he would like to pause the interview. I wondered what 
“feeling rules” (Kasket, 2006b, p.386) Paul had learned throughout his medical training 
and the spaces he had had to express his emotional responses. His patient had not 
become an ‘other’ or ‘object’ to relate to, but instead had become his friend. In addition, 
Brian had advocated dignity related to personhood extending beyond a person’s death. 
This was potentially informed by his own religious beliefs, specifically that of eternal 
life. Research has demonstrated that religiosity can mitigate death anxiety (Lundh & 
Radon, 1998; Neimeyer, 1994), by committing to a belief-system that transcends the 
temporal boundaries of individual mortality and thus avoids the absolute confrontation 
with one’s own end.  
This may not be solely related to religious beliefs, but also in the way in which 
persons make meaning out of their relationship to time and its finiteness. Max described 
how his experience of working with patients had changed as he had become older. 
Dickinson et al. (1999) found that senior doctors with twenty years of medical 
experience were more comfortable communicating with terminally ill patients and their 
families regarding death and dying. Contrary to this finding, for the participants of this 
study, age became associated with increased personal experiences of death and disease, 
while the reality of mortality appeared to become more salient as contrasted with the 
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way in which Max regarded his own life when he was a young doctor as ‘bulletproof’ 
[M.420]. Paul also echoed this sentiment when he reflected on how when he was 
younger, he did not take his ‘mortality seriously’ [P.516]. Freud (1915/1957) wrote in 
‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’: 
 
It is impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so we 
can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators…at bottom no-one 
believes in his own death…in the unconscious everyone of us is convinced of his 
own immortality (p.289).  
 
This conviction of one’s own immortality may be challenged for doctors 
confronted with the realities of mortality. Although there does appear to be a process of 
defending against this reality in youth, some participants commented on how their 
relationship to their own mortality had changed with age and through their work with 
MND. Max reported a growing discomfort with ‘these kind of catastrophic 
conversations’ [M.756-757] as he became older, which he attributed to less space to 
‘decompensate’ [M.509]. However, as he becomes older, it might also be that a 
confrontation with the existential givens becomes less avoidable, as he reflects on how 
he begins to develop an embodied awareness of his mortality through the experience of 
hypertension and his aching joints. Working with MND may make it more difficult to 
live life in the belief of immortality. Death anxiety can then be regarded as life-
enhancing, characterised by an “impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which 
has been released from the illusions of the ‘they’ and which is factical, certain of itself, 
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and anxious” (Heidegger, 1927/2010, p.266). The ‘they’ encompass the mass and the 
‘everyday’, which is the default state to which human beings return to, in order to cope 
with death anxiety. The ‘always-mineness’ of death is an individuating phenomenon, 
which tears the individual from society’s death defying or denying tendencies. The 
struggle between identifying with the ‘they’ and the individuation that accompanies a 
recognition of death as one’s own may be characterised by a combination of approach 
and avoidance approaches (Wong & Tomer, 2011) rather than sedimented in a binary 
either/or way of being.  
Mortality salience and shattered worlds 
Working with death and dying has been recognised as impacting mortality 
salience, defined as the recognition and awareness of one’s own mortality (Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). Mortality cues, or reminders of death, have also been 
linked to traumatic stressors. The latter is defined by critical events that pose a threat to 
the lives of self and other (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). Experiencing 
patients’ deaths could be considered a traumatic event in the life of doctors, though there 
appeared to be an avoidance of participants to label it as such. This was demonstrated in 
the rationality characteristic of the sub-theme ‘The facts of life’ and the way in which 
the experience of MND, and any potential trauma, was distanced from participants and 
their lifeworld. However, the presence of mortality cues do not necessarily mean they 
are traumatic (Sliter et al., 2014). It could be argued that it is the individual’s meaning-
making of mortality that constitutes its concomitant impact. Wong and Tomer (2011) 
have posited a meaning management theory (MMT) that focuses on the way in which 
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meaning making and meaning reconstruction can overcome death anxiety and lead to 
living an authentic existence. This is counter to terror management theory that focuses 
on defense-oriented models, as opposed to growth-oriented models. It could be argued 
that a focus on positive meaning is in itself a way in which to shield one’s self from the 
terror of death, as was demonstrated in the analysis of the way in which research became 
a tool to move away from ‘all the doom and gloom’ [Pe.191].  
Upon closer examination of participants meaning-making of the mortality cues 
imposed by their work, it can be seen that there were indications of potential trauma-
related responses. This was demonstrated in the imagery participants used to describe 
their clinics (Max) and the impact on patients (John), which reflected scenes of battle, 
war, and destruction. The term ‘imposed’ is used to highlight the way in which working 
with patients may have plunged some participants into confronting death and dying. One 
particularly significant example is that of Ian who repeats his resistance to being ‘drawn 
in’ [I.655] by patients when asked what he would do if he was them. This highlights the 
tensions that participants may deal with in negotiating the distance between doctor and 
patient, while also highlighting Ian’s own demarcation of his “normative limit on 
mutuality” (Buber, 1970, p.179). Furthermore, war-like imagery reinforces both a 
polarised ‘us versus them’ mode of relating while also evoking the potential destruction 
inherent in the transgression of battle lines. 
 Stolorow’s (2007) work depicts trauma as forced and unchosen, exposing the 
way in which trauma can shatter the absolutisms of everyday life. The assumptions that 
maintain these absolutisms may also reside within the medical context in regards to the 
way in which death is potentially considered as a failure of medicine (Maclean, 1979). 
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These could be shattered when patients do die, and doctors are thrust into a world where 
it may feel that others do not understand their experience, expressed in this study’s 
theme of ‘You’re never going to know what that’s going to be like’ [M.367-368]. 
Whereas trauma and grief are recognised and legitimised for family and friends, for 
example through bereavement rituals and counselling, doctors may experience 
‘disenfranchised grief’ (Doka, 2002; Lathrop, 2017). This occurs when a loss is incurred 
that cannot be publicly acknowledged, mourned or supported (Doka, 2002).  
The challenges that the expression of emotion represented for participants 
explored in this study, as well as the conceptualisation of the rules around emotional 
responses in the doctor-patient relationship, suggest that there is an element of 
disenfranchisement. This is underpinned by the sense that the consideration and 
acknowledgement of perceived ‘negative’ emotions will lead to being overwhelmed by 
emotions that will impede clinical judgment. Therefore, emotions are relegated to hidden 
unacknowledged spaces, such as Ian’s living room, as he cries alone. The separation of 
work and home life, described by many participants, may mean that this separation 
extends to the emotional boundaries enacted at work, which entirely eliminates potential 
spaces for the contemplation of affective responses.  
Robichaud (2003) wrote an impassioned plea to the creation of space in the 
practice of medicine to acknowledge emotions, and to use them as a valuable source of 
information with which to understand what it means to suffer. However, these doctors’ 
relationships to emotion appears to be complex, in addition to the interventions posited 
with which to manage them (Wolpin, Chabner, Lynch, & Penson, 2005). The expression 
of emotions and the meaning derived from them arose in the research and echoes 
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previous research exploring the way in which the suppression of emotions is understood 
as a mode of managing emotions which potentially threaten to overwhelm the doctor 
(Kasket, 2006, Feifel, 1969, Strack, 1997). The function of what participants may have 
conceived of as emotional regulation, rather than suppression, was manifold and 
appeared to serve the perceived needs of the patient - that of professionalism and 
expertise.  
This contrasts with the needs identified by Aoun, O’Brien, Breen, and 
O’Connor’s (2018) findings obtained through collecting qualitative accounts from 
patients with MND regarding the experiences of receiving a diagnosis. One issue that 
emerged was the need to shift the focus of best practice to the person’s values and 
preferences, as well as psychosocial and existential concerns. This has implications for 
the way in which doctors practice, however it also raises questions about doctors’ 
assumptions relating to patients’ needs. Aoun et al.’s (2016) study into breaking the 
news of a diagnosis of MND revealed significant differences between doctors whose 
skills had been rated high or low in delivering the diagnosis ranked according to the 
SPIKES protocol (Baile et al., 2000). The largest differences were in the domain of 
responding empathically to the feelings of the patient and family. The management of 
emotions may have fulfilled various multi-dimensional needs of doctors. For example, 
Peter expressed the need for ‘an element of detachment otherwise you’d never get up 
and see the next patient and be a good doctor for them’ [Pe.434-437]. The negotiation of 
how far is too close (Wolpin et al., 2005) appeared to be bound in the interaction 
between the identity of what it means to be a ‘good doctor’ and the relationship to 
emotional responses. This may serve an adaptive function in allowing doctors the 
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emotional space to attend to the next patient, but has significant implications, when the 
unacknowledged is conceived of being as in the service of the patient. This could also 
impact the ways in which doctors find the containment needed to connect to the other in 
what feels safe while also human; two potentially conflicting modes of being.  
The facilitators of detachment 
Corn (2010) has contributed to debates regarding whether those who work with 
death and dying engage in bereavement practices. Corn’s findings broadly suggested 
that such practitioners avoided emotional engagement with the grief process. However, 
while the current research supports this to a certain extent largely through detachment 
and identification with what it means to be a ‘good doctor’, a more nuanced 
understanding emerged in the current study. Though participants did not explicitly refer 
to any bereavement practices, except to deny bereavement in the case of Max, there may 
be institutionalised structures that do not facilitate the validation of processes such as 
anticipatory grief or the expression of emotions, which could lead to disenfranchised 
grief (Doka, 2002). This may interact with participants’ own internal processes that 
maintain boundaries such as compartmentalisation (Granek, Mazzotta, Tozer, & 
Krzyzanowska, 2013), denial (Becker, 1973), or avoidance (Griffiths et al., 2015). These 
constitute several potential responses to the difficulties encountered in working with 
dying patients. The disenfranchisement of emotional responses may begin at a systemic 
level along a patient’s illness trajectory. Most of the participants interviewed were 
doctors whom patients would meet with to confirm or dis-confirm a diagnosis of MND. 
Some participants were involved in research to help treat MND, while none reported 
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being present at the stage of one of their patient’s death. Participants may have chosen 
not to disclose or expand on experiences of their patients’ deaths, which could reflect an 
avoidance or a denial of death. It is also possible that they were unintentionally, or 
intentionally, shielded from patients’ deaths on a systemic level as a result of the nature 
of the illness trajectory. They described how once patients need palliative care 
interventions, they will often enter hospice or stay at home. In addition, communication 
of patients’ deaths to doctors appeared to be limited. John reported that, ‘I get a letter 
saying that they’re dead’ [J.140], while Peter described how it took some time before 
someone in the team might inform him someone has died. Patients not only stopped 
attending clinics, so did their relatives, and it had felt that doctors not only established 
relationships with patients that were severed, but also with relatives. The lack of endings 
highlighted by participants have implications for clinical practice, as this may need to be 
considered in the way in which Counselling Psychologists address endings in any 
therapeutic work undertaken in this particular setting. Death is an ending in itself, and 
the provision of a space to consider the meaning around endings may have significance 
in relation to any potential bereavement or grief processes. 
Death is not a singular discrete event and participants’ experiences of working 
with patients were suffused with themes of death and grappling with meaning. Paul 
appeared to be experiencing elements of anticipatory mourning (Fulton et al., 1996) as 
he reflected on the inevitable death of his friend and patient. Therefore, though systemic 
structures may not facilitate the validation of emotional responses to working with death 
and dying, these do not preclude the lived experience of these feelings. Doctors may not 
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actively engage in bereavement practices, however this does not mean that they do not 
experience emotions associated with loss (Granek et al., 2013 ; Mount, 1986).  
Although not shown to be causally related, it can be surmised that boundaries 
facilitate the management of emotional processes that threaten to overwhelm, or result in 
becoming ‘emotionally incontinent’ [M.519-520]. This resonates with Friedrichsen and 
Milberg’s (2006) finding that breaking bad news for doctors involved a risk of losing 
control in areas such as their emotions and behaviour in response to patients’ reactions. 
The focus on retaining control may be one way in which to regulate challenging 
emotional responses, in the absence of containment elsewhere. Ian described how 
important it was not to cry in front of the patient, while he found that he would have a 
delayed reaction to a patient’s death, where he would find himself sometimes crying 
alone at home. Malterud and Hollnagel (2005) describes this as a spontaneous form of 
disclosure, rather than the considered sharing of experience, whereby vulnerability 
becomes closely bound to a sense of professional responsibility to the patient and part of 
the doctor’s identity (Aase et al., 2008). For Ian, this appeared to be unexpected rather 
than spontaneous, and may have been evidence of the fragility of the boundaries that he 
had built to protect himself from revealing the emotional responses to his work. The 
absence of bereavement rituals or practices may facilitate the experiential avoidance of 
patients’ deaths thus reinforcing Buberian I-It relations. The patient doesn’t become a 
person who dies but a snapshot of the disease, located in a DNA sample left in their 
legacy or a point on a ‘trajectory’ [Pe.530]. This may represent one way in which 
participants experience and make meaning of the death of their patients.  
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The boundaries that appeared to be managed by participants between detachment 
and empathic connection is a tension that has been explored in the wider literature. 
Whitehead (2014) explored the negotiation of the balance between personal and 
professional reactions to patient deaths. One of the themes identified was that of action 
versus presence. Non-palliative physicians reported entering an active-oriented mode, 
whereby awareness of personal experience had to be shut down. Palliative physicians 
described a more presence-oriented mode at the time of patient’s deaths (Whitehead, 
2014). Research may have provided one way in which participants were able to engage 
in patient care using an active-oriented mode. However, challenges may arise when an 
active orientation becomes one of ‘doing-to’ rather than ‘doing-with’. This was 
demonstrated throughout Brian’s narrative who emphasised the latter in his work. He 
was the only palliative care physician interviewed, which is significant in regards to the 
different relationship Brian may have had to a professional identity based on the 
philosophy of the palliative care approach. This is predicated on a holistic, presence-
oriented approach that seeks to achieve a ‘good death’ (Cipolletta & Operandi, 2014). 
Action is potentially a way in which doctors are able to avoid the difficulties 
associated with being in the presence of death and dying. Research itself confers a 
pursuit of knowledge and certainty that may be a way in which doctors are able to make 
sense of the uncertainty, helplessness, and anxiety that can often arise in working with 
diseases such as MND (Carter et al., 1998). There may be fluidity between action and 
presence-oriented modes of being. The existential framework used advocates the 
movement between two polarities for psychology well-being, with issues occurring 
when a person becomes rigidly attached to either polarity (van Deurzen & Adams, 
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2016). One example that may emerge when working with patients is derived from 
Goffman’s (1959) concept of the front and back regions. Cain’s (2012) research into the 
behaviours of hospice workers demonstrated the complex relationship between fronts as 
performances and back regions as authentic presentations of self. These were integrated 
into a professional identity that emphasised authentic expression of emotions. This 
contributes to an understanding of the way in which the participants of this study 
engaged in processes of detachment and its relationship to authenticity and emotions. 
This facilitates an awareness of participants’ experience as “persons-in-context” (Larkin 
& Thompson, 2012, p.102) rather than contexts in action. The negotiation of detachment 
and authenticity appeared to be complex, as demonstrated by aspects of Ian’s potentially 
performative display of empathy intersecting with his conscious connection to the 
human parts of the interaction with a spouse of a patient who died. She had handed him 
a card from the funeral, sharing her doubt over whether he’d just put it in the bin. His 
response illuminated the tensions that may arise when negotiating the awareness of 
authentic emotional responses embedded in the relational world.   
 
…It was just so obvious…I just said ‘that’s so kind of you I’d like to have a look 
through that’ you and it’s just obvious but yes if I was being a complete robot 
about it I’d have said well yes I’m not quite sure where I’m going to put that 
[laughs] you know so it’s these tiny moments…those pivotal moments, you get it 
wrong, it’s really catastrophic. [I.1234-1246]  
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These moments described by participants and the wider literature (Jackson et al., 
2005; Mount, 2003; Ratanawongsa et al., 2005) illustrate the inter-subjective spaces 
within which doctors are impacted by the other to respond in ways that challenge the 
facilitators of detachment by choosing to connect with their humanity and to take the 
leap of faith into the unknown (van Deurzen & Adams, 2016). It is in these decisive 
moments that constitute the relationship, making one’s self vulnerable to making 
mistakes, that demonstrate the authenticity of what it means to be human. This may 
create further tensions when being the expert and facilitating detachment challenges the 
infallibility and connection central to human relatedness.  
Death as other? 
For some participants, the separation of self and other involved a clear 
demarcation that the experience of MND was located in the patient, rather than in the 
inter-subjective space between two human beings. The separation between self and other 
may be a way in which to protect participants’ sense of self from the unthinkable 
annihilation of the self, as understood by psychoanalytic interpretations (Freud, 
1915/1957). The survival of the self may be facilitated by locating disease, and thereby 
death, in the other. Individuals may then project their fears onto the other in the hopes 
they may bear the ‘unthinkable’ death. This appeared to also occur between patients and 
spouses, referred to by Ian, who referenced Oscar Wilde’s (1891/2008) The Picture of 
Dorian Gray. Patients themselves may be unable to bear the anticipation of death and so 
project feelings onto their spouses, or indeed their doctors. Patients’ own loss of self in 
the midst of death may be re-enacted by their loss of self in the doctor-patient 
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relationship, as expanded upon previously, whereby self and other become characterised 
by relations governed by objectivity and ‘doing-to’ rather than honouring the 
subjectivity of ‘being-with’. However, participants often spoke of patients’ experiences 
of MND, to the extent that at times I would need to ask questions to bring them back to 
their own experience. This is a similar phenomenon experienced by other researchers 
exploring doctors’ experiences of death and dying (Kasket, 2006).  
Although Freud conceptualised death as being the ‘unthinkable’, existentialism 
posits that an awareness of death allows a person to live an existence more purposefully 
and authentically as a ‘Being-towards-death’ (Heidegger, 1927/2010). It is precisely the 
nothingness that awaits that makes an authentic existence all the more significant. Most 
of the participants talked about appreciating and valuing their own lives. Peter 
remembered how ‘coming home some years ago from these kind of catastrophic 
conversations with young people with small children…feeling I’ve got to value and 
cherish what I do have’ [M.756-760]. This supports the prevailing consensus in the 
literature that doctors experience conversations with patients regarding death and dying 
as difficult (Fallowfield et al., 2002). However, the current study’s findings demonstrate 
that borne out of these ‘catastrophic conversations’ [M.757] is a call to finding meaning 
and authenticity in a doctor’s own life. This highlights the importance and existential 
impact of these conversations, not only for patients themselves (Boston et al., 2011), but 
for doctors as well.  
Max reported spending his money and not saving, ‘driven to enjoy life as it is’ 
[M.770], ‘take every opportunity’ [M.771], while Paul talked about ‘making life count’ 
[P.707] now rather than later. These are just some examples of the way in which 
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participants made sense of their own lives in the context of death, beyond terror and 
denial (Wong & Tomer, 2011). The language used also expresses the urgency with 
which this approach to valuing life may have been adopted. This focus may have been 
facilitated by one of the interview questions that asked participants what the impact of 
their work had been on their views about death. However, death resulting from disease 
was also acknowledged by participants such as Max who, though he firmly understood 
MND to reside in his patients, understood his own potential disease narrative in regards 
to heart disease. This could be understood as a result of identification (Meier et al., 
2001), which also occurred when patients had families with whom participants could 
identify with. Identification of similarity appeared to be the most salient in regards to 
managing difficult emotional responses. Young patients were also cited as particularly 
difficult, as in the case of Ian. This may be as a result of the challenges borne out of 
similarity, and the extent to which death was able to be identified as other. It may be 
easier to distance one’s self from a disease located in the other, as opposed to death that 
transcends the boundaries of this self and that other.  
Normative limits on mutuality 
Buber’s I-It relationship is one in which others become related to as objects of 
thought or in social relations. This type may predominate relationships within the 
medical context in regards to objectivity, detachment, and order. Cohn (2001) describes 
I-Thou relationships as those characterised by “spontaneity, subjectivity, reciprocity, and 
recognition and acceptance of the unique other” (p.170). She advocates the development 
of therapeutic relationships in medical practice that move towards the I-Thou 
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relationship described by Buber and his social-existentialist vision. The demarcations of 
this relationship are continuously drawn anew, balancing between the maximum of good 
and the minimum of evil (Cohn, 2001). This is useful in understanding how the nature of 
the relationship to self and other may exist on a continuum, dynamically responding to 
the inter-subjective realm of human relating. Difficulties may arise when one is rigidly 
positioned at one polarity in an either/or relationship, rather than a both/and; movement 
is possible between the It-world and the Thou-world. Furthermore, there may be aspects 
of both relationships that are necessary for doctors to have with patients.  
Buber’s (1970) concept of the “normative limit on mutuality” suggests that there 
are limits placed on the degree of mutuality between doctor and patient (p.179). Cohn 
(2001) relates this to the function of the relationship, which is purposive and not one of 
equals. This resonates with the power relations that participants discussed, particularly 
Max in regards to being the expert and the one with ‘all the life-changing sentences’ 
[M.834]. However, these power relations may be challenged by phenomena such as the 
Internet, which some participants (Peter, Paul, and Ian) referred to regarding the impact 
it had on patients’ expectations of treatment and the knowledge they had. People are 
increasingly turning to the Internet to find answers and information about their disease 
and possible treatment. In regards to MND, there are expensive treatments, such as stem 
cell therapy that offer the promise of cure despite having little evidence to support their 
use (Talbot & Marsden, 2008). However, some of the participants had to contend with 
explaining why they would not offer that treatment, which would involve the translating 
of scientific research and complex medical concepts to the bedside of patients. Peter 
described the trust that he felt was needed by patients that ‘these guys are looking into 
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everything and they’ll tell us if something is worthwhile or not’ [Pe.643-645]. The 
Internet may thus exert some pressure on the limits of mutuality as patients become 
more informed and their expectations of doctors shift. This has interesting implications 
for what is ‘truth’, and the way in which doctors must engage with a potentially shifting 
conceptualisation of a doctor’s identity that no longer resides in the implicit trust of 
doctor as expert. This is particularly pertinent in the rise of the anti-vaxxers movements 
and the rise of fake news (Armstrong & Naylor, 2019). Furthermore, developing trust 
would appear to necessitate the development of an I-Thou relationship. This may have 
implications for doctors who may resist any movement away from their own unique and 
subjective “normative limit” (Buber, 1970, p.179). 
The impact of attitudes towards death 
Attitudes towards death have been shown to have an effect on end-of-life care 
(EoLC) (Leombruni et al., 2014; Thiemann et al., 2015). Brian referred to his patients as 
‘persons’; ‘the person they are’ [B.293-294]. He emphasised the connection between 
dignity and their personhood bound up in a personal worth that extends beyond a 
person’s life. He related this to the impact of MND, which he suggests has the potential 
to threaten a person’s dignity, not due to the illness itself but as a result of ‘our 
responses to the illness and because of our responses to someone with an illness’ 
[B.296-298]. This recognises the reciprocity and mutuality involved in the doctor-patient 
relationship, while also acknowledging the impact of attitudes and values. This 
awareness was not always present for participants, and there appeared to be a disconnect 
between the way in which participants viewed themselves and the way they described 
 111 
interacting with patients. For example, Ian was aware that suicide may be a topic that 
patients want to talk about, and he was clear that he wanted to provide an open and non-
judgmental space for which patients to be able to speak about this with him. However, 
when patients did speak about the possibility of assisted dying, such as going to Dignitas 
in Switzerland, or taking their own lives at home, Ian would ask them to think about the 
people who would find them or return home on the plane without them. This may have 
demonstrated one way in which Ian had adopted a compassionate stance towards 
patients’ relatives. However, it might have also missed an opportunity to explore 
patients’ suicidal feelings. This could have been a reflection of Ian’s own feelings 
regarding assisted suicide, which he stated he was opposed to as he felt it was not 
commensurate with his role as a doctor. Thus, attitudes towards death can inform 
doctors’ interactions with patients, while also contributing to the delineation of 
professional identity and responsibilities.  
An exploration of the function and maintenance of boundaries must include an 
awareness that experiential avoidance may not always be a robust strategy with which to 
manage the complexities of healthcare professionals’ attitudes towards death. This may 
be further warranted as a result of the potential discrepancies that professionals may 
have in self-reports of attitudes and the realities of communication (Rodenbach, R., 
Rodenbach, K., Tejani, & Epstein, 2016). This has implications for the way in which 
end-of-life care is delivered, and the medical decisions made.  Thurn et al. (2019) 
assessed physicians’ attitudes toward end-of-life decisions in ALS and found that 
physicians’ recognition of psycho-existential suffering had an impact on more 
favourable attitudes towards withdrawing invasive ventilation, while affecting attitudes 
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towards performing continuous sedation until death negatively. Furthermore, religiosity 
was associated with more reluctant attitudes towards end of life care in palliative 
practice (Thurn et al., 2019). 
Making a difference 
The role of research and the sub-theme ‘Feeling the feelings’ highlighted 
potential coping strategies in the midst of the existential endeavor of meaning-making. 
In particular, the sense of meaning and purpose emerged in relation to ‘making a 
difference’. Although these were not explicitly identified by participants as coping 
strategies, in the context of the existing literature into compassion fatigue and burnout, 
finding meaning and purpose in one’s own work has been recognised as a mitigating 
factor in avoiding burnout (Ablett & Jones, 2007; Holland & Neimeyer, 2005; Yoder, 
2010). Finding meaning has often been attributed to patients’ processes when faced with 
their mortality (Boston, Bruce, Schreiber, 2011), however it could be argued that those 
working in providing care to these patients may also benefit from identifying meaning 
and purpose. Brian recounted one of his most memorable experiences of a patient who 
appeared to encapsulate the subjectivity of meaning. Whereas Brian’s colleagues 
attributed the answers of his patient to brain failure or to asking the wrong question, 
Brian had tried to make sense of his patient describing his quality of life ‘as good now as 
it was then’ [B.967-968]. Brian describes how he may have come to understand how his 
patient’s quality and meaning of life shifted as it unfolded, enabling the re-framing of 
hopes and expectations. Brian described this as a ‘foundational experience’ [B.1015], 
similar to the ‘teachable moments’ described in Jackson et al.’s (2005, p.654) study. 
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Additionally, it demonstrates the reciprocity inherent in the doctor-patient relationships, 
as patients’ experiences impacted on participants’ own meaning-making.   
Brian’s own sense of meaning and purpose appeared to intersect with his 
religious beliefs and his understanding of a broader existential purpose. To a certain 
extent, Brian’s purpose in life is determined by God, as he quotes the catechism, ‘what is 
the chief end of man? To...worship God and enjoy him forever’ [B.454-455]. This may 
provide a variety of benefits in regards to attaching him to an ‘immortality project’ that 
has been found to exist in most religions (Becker, 1973). The corresponding belief-
system also outlines its own existential givens, specifically in regards to the belief of 
eternal life. Brian connected the role of this belief to his work with patients. It seemed as 
though Brian’s work provided him with both meaning and purpose, which he related to 
his religious beliefs. On the other hand, Paul highlighted his concerns about how patients 
and colleagues might perceive his efforts to make a difference.  
 
The worst thing would be…if a patient thought that my relationship with them was 
in some way not personal because they thought that it came from um I’m just a 
Christian wanting to do good things and then they saw that as being impersonal. 
[P.775-782] 
 
Thus, the ways in which participants found meaning and purpose were bound in 
complex ways to their understanding of what making a difference meant to both 
themselves and to patients. Furthermore, conflicts could also be seen to develop when 
two conflicting belief-systems collided in the unfolding of their ‘immortality projects’ 
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(Becker, 1973). It could be argued that science itself is a belief-system that provides a 
way of denying death in the pursuit of cure and ever-lasting life. This could create 
tensions that participants may have had to manage, while also challenging what it meant 
for them to make a difference and find a sense of meaning and purpose in their work. 
This is significant in the context of working with MND, where there currently exists no 
cure and treatments predominantly focus on symptom management.  
Meaning and purpose may thus deviate from the systemic beliefs propagated by 
the wider medical culture, as participants identified for themselves what was meaningful 
about their work. Peter described ‘the human aspects of what we do’ [Pe.1006] in 
contrast to a relative’s job in the financial sector, while Ian reflected on the importance 
of conversation for his sense of meaning in why he does the work he does. Brian’s 
endeavor to understand how his patient made meaning out of his life highlights Brian’s 
own meaning-making ‘in the face of this unwanted unexpected catastrophically 
progressive illness’ [B.1006-1007]. My own inclusion of a discussion surrounding 
meaning and purpose may additionally represent my own pursuit of meaning making for 
both participants and the work they do. Nonetheless, the sense of meaning and purpose 
was present throughout the research and can be seen to be linked to a compassion 
satisfaction, which has been described as the pleasure received from being able to do 
your job well (Stamm, 2002). This was highlighted by Ian and Brian who repeatedly 
mentioned the importance of ‘feeling that you do your job well’ [I.89]. Acknowledging 
the differences and subjectivity of what it means to ‘do your job well’ [I.89] in the 
context of working with MND could be challenged by the dominant medical discourse, 
which is conceptualised as a curative-based model. Participants demonstrated the 
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multiplicity of meaning that exists in relation to the role of a doctor working with MND. 
These ranged from being able to ‘make it less bad’ [B.145] to ‘everything is working’ 
[J.218]. On one hand, compassion satisfaction may be seen to further add to the 
difficulties conceptualising burnout and compassion fatigue, as the latter have been 
distinguished by their differing relation to the work environment (Kearney et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, the findings of this research have demonstrated the way in which 
participants’ relationship to work may intersect with experiences of compassion 
satisfaction. This may offer an opportunity with which to regard concepts such as 
burnout and compassion fatigue as mutual rather than as dichotomous. The way in 
which participants conceived of their work suggests that finding meaning, as well as 
purpose, in one’s work has an important impact on the way in which they make sense of 
their experience. 
Limitations and methodological reflexivity  
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was used as the methodology to 
answer the research questions formulated. Reflecting on the use of this methodology has 
highlighted several advantages, as well as limitations of the methodology. The research 
question sought to explore the lived experience of doctors working with patients dying 
from motor neurone disease. IPA does appear to have been the appropriate methodology 
as it prioritises the phenomenological method in understanding the lived experience of 
participants (Smith, 2017). However, a recent academic exchange in the journal of 
Qualitative Health Research between Jonathan Smith, the founder of IPA, and Max Van 
Manen exposed tensions that may exist within the methodology. Van Manen (2018) 
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argued that IPA was more akin to Interpretative Psychological Analysis, rather than 
phenomenology in its original sense. Although Smith (2017) has described IPA as a 
methodology that is both psychological and experiential in nature, he points to van 
Manen’s misrepresentations of IPA, as well as his sedimented characterisation of 
phenomenology. 
 Elements of the arguments put forth resonate for myself as a researcher and as a 
trainee Counselling Psychologist. There are parts of the interpretative process that 
naturally draw on the ‘making sense’ skills of formulation in therapeutic practice. In 
addition, the interviews necessitated aspects of therapeutic skill such as empathy, 
exploration, and at times, containment. This, however, was not therapy. As Smith (2018) 
argues, IPA considers people as inherently self-reflective who naturally make attempts 
to make sense of their experiences. The researcher becomes a part of this sense-making 
process, as well as a witness to its expression, in the co-construction of knowledge that 
emerges. This is consistent with a Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology, rather 
than a more Husserlian return to “the things themselves” (Husserl, 1936/1970, p.53). In 
responding to the exchange, Zahavi (2019) suggested that qualitative researchers focus 
on their research being informed by central phenomenological concepts, such as 
empathy, a participant’s lifeworld, their historicity and embodiment. 
The ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning this research 
understands the double hermeneutic as an important component in exploring 
phenomenology. Acknowledging the use of the self through reflexivity and employing 
concepts such as intersubjectivity highlights the embedded position of the researcher in 
relation to the participants’ experience. It is difficult to comprehend how a participant’s 
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phenomenology could wholly emerge unscathed by the researcher’s own experience. 
IPA further acknowledges that what develops is one of multiple realities that may exist 
for participants rather than any objective knowledge (Berger, 2015). The core of the 
debate may reside in ontological conceptualisations of the lived experience, as van 
Manen (2017) refers to a lived experience grounded in consciousness whereby the 
researcher delves into the “phenomenality of the phenomenon” (p.811) by asking, “what 
is it like?” On the other hand, IPA seeks to make sense of another person engaged in 
their own ‘making sense of’ an experience. Thus, the limitations of this research may be 
influenced by the philosophical position adopted by the reader in regards to the extent to 
which IPA can truly be phenomenological in its original sense and whether this is indeed 
desirable in the context of the constructivist assumptions underpinning the methodology 
adopted.  
One of the critiques identified at the beginning of this research was the extent to 
which participants could express their lived experiences and the role of language in this 
process (Willig, 2013). It could be argued that, based on this critique, a more 
constructionist methodology such as discourse analysis may have been more 
appropriate. However, this would have necessitated a different research question based 
on how doctors constructed their experiences rather than exploring their lived 
experience. The emerging literature suggested that it was difficult for doctors to express 
their emotional world (Robichaud, 2003), as well as highlighting potential issues of 
avoidance in regards to discussing death and dying. This may have posed difficulties 
based on IPA’s reliance on the ability of participants to express their experience 
however, the methodology does not state any intention to reach an objective, universal, 
 118 
nor singular ‘truth’ based on any realist premise. Furthermore, it is precisely the way in 
which participants attempt to express their experience and the attributed meaning that 
forms part of IPA’s endeavor to understand the complexity of human experience. The 
focus on death and dying may have imposed an assumption that working with patients 
would have an existential impact on participants. Research questions could have omitted 
death and dying, nonetheless the inclusion of the focus on death and dying was justified 
in light of the aims of exploring the existential dimension, as well as contributing to the 
literature on doctors’ experiences of working with death and dying.   
A social desirability bias may have emerged whereby participants felt they 
needed to present themselves in a specific way, as a competent professional for example. 
This may have contributed to the final analysis and discussion areas related to the way in 
which participants made sense of their identities around their role as doctor. The 
reference to ‘doctors’ and ‘patients’ may have reinforced this dualistic perspective and 
contributed to the separate conceptualisation of both identities. Nonetheless, participants 
predominantly used these terms, rather than terms such as person with MND. This was 
reflected on in the analysis and formed part of the discussion, relating to the relationship 
between self and other. The criticisms of IPA regarding lack of generalisability are not 
relevant to the outcomes of this research to a certain extent, as a result of its idiographic 
focus. In addition, Yardley (2000) has raised questions over the appropriateness of 
criterion such as reliability and generalisability in relation to measuring the quality of 
qualitative research. The inclusion of triangulation may be important to consider in 
future studies, in order to address the areas of validity and transparency in qualitative 
research (Yardley, 2000). Although participants were offered feedback on the results of 
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the study informally, none responded. This may have been improved by sending a 
follow-up email with a clearer opt-in procedure. However, lack of initial response to 
feedback may be significant in regards to participants’ own feelings about being part of 
the research process, as well as possibly reinforcing aspects of the themes identified in 
the research in relation to potential shame, stigma, and existential isolation. 
 
Implications for Counselling Psychology and allied fields 
The importance assigned to empathic communication, as well as to the function 
of boundaries in the doctor-patient relationship, suggests that interventions need to 
address the tensions emerging between the need for detachment and empathy. This is 
particularly significant when considering the function of maintaining boundaries for 
participants and the potential resistance to putting ‘ourselves in their shoes’ [I.435]. 
These have significant implications for the way in which values such as empathy are 
integrated into medical practice. How do we ask doctors to practice an empathic 
approach when it is empathy itself that creates challenges? Interventions thus far have 
attempted to address these concerns in medical training and education, however the 
outcomes of this approach have yet to be evaluated (Cavaye & Watts, 2014). Moreover, 
these may be inadequate in addressing the psychological challenges arising in the 
tensions explored, as well as offering a reductionist perspective in attributing the 
challenges in working with patients with terminal illnesses to deficits in training and 
education.  
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This research illustrated how spaces for psychological support appeared to reside 
with other colleagues. Thus a multi-disciplinary team approach may be appropriate 
when considering psychological interventions. Schwartz Rounds are a forum for staff to 
discuss and reflect on non-clinical aspects of caring for patients (Goodrich, 2012). These 
have been shown to reduce stress, build cohesion and engagement with other 
professionals, as well as developing empathy skills (Barker, Cornwell, & Gishen, 2016; 
Chadwick, Muncer, Hannon, Goodrich, & Cornwell, 2016; George, 2016). Hierarchical 
dynamics would need to be considered, as the expression of emotion has been found to 
be inhibited in the presence of senior colleagues (Jackson et al., 2005). However, 
reflective spaces that include all levels of seniority may also facilitate the modeling of 
emotional rules and contribute to the design of compassionate care (Crawford et al., 
2014).  
Compassion focused therapy (CFT) is based on the conceptualisation of 
compassion as a sensitivity to suffering in self and others with a commitment to try to 
alleviate it and prevent it (Gilbert et al., 2011). There are also similarities to Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT) that focuses on values and meaning within the context 
of committed action. These are two therapeutic modalities within the third-wave 
cognitive behavioural therapy tradition that build on existential themes identified in 
working with death and dying. These may be potential approaches to working with 
healthcare professionals in light of the findings of this study, particularly as shame, self-
criticism, and stigma may form part of their psychological experience (Gilbert et al., 
2011).  
 121 
As scientist practitioners, Counselling Psychologists are informed by an evidence 
base used within the context of the therapeutic relationship (Woolfe et al., 2010). Brian 
had made the observation that just as those around him did not know what his job 
entailed, he did not know what a Counselling Psychologist was. This perhaps reflects 
parallels of the therapeutic relationship that exists between doctor and patient, as well as 
between Counselling Psychologist and client. Both constitute elements of the I-Thou 
relationship, and as Counselling Psychologists resist ‘thing-ifying’ the client within the 
remits of their role, doctors are tasked with a different way of being, steeped in a 
medical model that may necessitate the movement into the I-It world. These differences 
may reside in the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the medical and 
therapeutic models. Moreover, they could be based on assumptions propagated by the 
medical model that delineate disease in either/or terms; you either have MND or you do 
not. This enables the concept of cure to offer resolution in a linear cause-effect 
relationship. Counselling psychologists must also increasingly operate within a medical 
model that may exert pressure to adopt an I-It mode of relating. However, unlike 
Counselling Psychologists, doctors are not required to have personal therapy or attend 
personal supervision, though these have been identified as robust strategies with which 
to manage difficulties arising in fields requiring emotional labour (Kearney et al., 2009; 
Sanchez-Reilly et al., 2013). Counselling Psychology’s emphasis on reflective practice 
and phenomenological inquiry can provide important modeling opportunities with which 
to support other HCPs, while using a robust evidence base to develop dialogical 
relationships.   
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Suggestions for future research 
All the participants that were interviewed were male therefore the findings are 
limited to the experiences of men working with death and dying. Although this study’s 
research aims did not focus on a gendered dimension, future research could consider the 
extent to which gender impacts on the experiences of working with MND. This is 
significant as a result of existing research suggesting mixed results in regards to finding 
gendered differences in measures such as death anxiety (Thiemann et al., 2015). Death 
anxiety is a multi-dimensional construct (Lehto & Stein, 2009) and thus future research 
is needed to contribute further understanding into the way in which death anxiety may 
interact with phenomena such as burnout and compassion fatigue. 
Further research into healthcare professionals’ experiences of working with 
patients with MND may be valuable considering the complexity of the nature of their 
work and the themes that emerged. Focus groups would enable a forum with which to 
contribute to an understanding of doctors’ needs in regards to psychological support. 
The perceived reluctance of participants to acknowledge the difficulty that their work 
involved warrants further exploration beyond the limited scope of this study into the 
tensions and challenges that may exist, while also holding onto the possibility that 
difficulties may not always be present. Furthermore, the assumptions of participants 
regarding the needs of patients in regards to doctors’ emotional expression necessitates 
further dialogue between doctors and patients regarding the nature of empathic 
communication.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the findings support those found in the wider literature exploring 
doctors’ experiences working with death and dying. Participants were engaged in 
various forms of experiential avoidance that provided numerous functions, such as 
protection from potentially overwhelming functions, and being able to fulfil aspects of 
their professional identity. However, strategies of dis-connection were not as robust as 
has been reported previously in pre-existing findings (Meier et al., 2010). Although 
some participants were consciously aware of being engaged in processes of detachment, 
identification with patients and existential themes of confronting mortality, threatened to 
transcend the boundaries that had been established by participants and wider institutional 
structures. This supports the prevailing evidence found for the significant impact of 
identification with patients on doctors’ ability to maintain a detached position (Aase et 
al., 2008). However, the findings of this research demonstrated the unique challenges 
that working with MND presented to doctors. It has contributed to understanding how 
doctors may address difficulties in their work. These may consist of committing to 
research as a way to find certainty and meaning when working with diseases such as 
MND. It is a disease that does not offer the comfort of cure with which to assuage the 
doctor’s fear of death or to neutralise the uncomfortable dissonance emerging from their 
perceived mandate to rid the patient of illness.   
This research has found that a broader existential engagement with confronting 
mortality and finding meaning can serve as a connection between one human being to 
another. The concepts of I-It and I-Thou relationships explored in the discussion are not 
singular discrete entities that constitute the totality of a relationship with the other in 
 124 
binary opposition. Instead, relationships will feature aspects of both, representing many 
and various modes of being that are dynamic and fluid in response to the lived 
experience of Being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1927/2010). Participants entered into and 
out of both types of relationship as they described their experiences of working with 
patients. Counselling Psychology sits in the milieu between art and science as it 
struggles with its identity of both at times. This struggle can be a place of growth and 
reflects a human struggle between certainty and uncertainty. Participants were engaged 
in a meaning-making process of what it meant to be a doctor working with patients 
dying from MND. This was embedded in the context of their own mortality, their 
relationship to their professional and personal identities, as well as their relationship to 
the other as patient. 
This research contributes to the field of Counselling Psychology and to allied 
fields of medicine, in its advocacy of Counselling Psychology’s ability to embrace the 
tensions and struggles that may emerge out of the depths of ‘the sum total of human 
misery’ [M.248]. The validation of all the human responses that manifest in the face of 
mortality can provide an important opportunity with which to connect on a relational 
level. This uses a set of core conditions that span the disciplines, specifically 
congruence, acceptance, and unconditional positive regard (Rogers, 1956). These are 
conditions that doctors, and Counselling Psychologists, are challenged with when called 
upon to be-with the other in the midst of psychological distress. In Being and Time 
(1927/2010), Heidegger conceptualised a person’s position in the world as a Being-in-
the-world to demonstrate the fundamental connection we all have to one another as 
humans embedded in a uniquely subjective but shared world. It is in the inter-subjective 
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encounter with the other that tears us from the illusions of the ‘they’ (Kaufmann, 1959) 
as we are forced to acknowledge both what it means to be a self in relation to the other, 
as well as what it means to share a set of universal existential givens. The difficult 
conversations participants have shared in this study, as well as those described in the 
wider literature, have demonstrated that understanding the complexities of this 
experience necessitates a turning towards the other in opening up the conversation to all 
involved.  
Boundaries may serve important functions that are presumed to be adaptive and 
protective, however they can also shut out or shut down important, albeit difficult, 
aspects of doctors’ experiences. Furthermore, the disconnection between aspects of 
participants’ experience may neglect the way in which all parts can provide both internal 
and external resources for doctors to draw upon. This research argues that this re-
connection necessitates a dialogical approach that uses relationality as a source of 
meaning and understanding. Branch (2000) has conceived of this dialogue as a caring 
one, involving an ethical orientation that requires doctors to feel as well as to reason. 
The negotiation of holding onto these polarities is complex, as this research has sought 
to demonstrate. To feel risks to be overwhelmed, while to only reason risks losing the 
empathic connection fundamental to our inter-relatedness as human beings.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A - Recruitment poster 
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Appendix B - Recruitment email to potential participants 
 
Dear Dr. ….,  
 
I am writing to invite you to participate in a piece of research I am doing as part of a 
doctorate in Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. I am looking to talk to 
doctors who have experience working with MND patients, and their experience of death 
and dying in this context. I have attached my recruitment poster with further 
information.  
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. I look forward to hearing 
from you. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
  
Sophie  
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Appendix C - Ethical approval  
 151 
Appendix D – Interview schedule  
Research question: What is the lived experience of doctors working with patients 
dying from motor neurone disease (MND)? 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part.  
Before we begin, if at any point you feel you need a break or feel unable to 
continue, please let me know.  
I’ll start by telling you a bit about myself…please tell me a bit about yourself.  
 
1. What attracted you to this study? 
2. How would you describe your work? 
3. What is it like working with patients who have MND? 
4. Can you describe an experience of working with a patient with MND? 
 
Prompts: A particularly memorable experience   
 
5. What has the effect of your work been on family/relationships/friends? 
 
Prompts: The impact on these relationships, differences in relating, effect of 
emotions, coping with emotions.   
 
6. What has been the effect on your life? 
 
Prompts: The way you think about life, about death, dying, and loss.  
 
7. Has your experience of working with patients changed over time?  
 
Prompts: What has changed? How? 
 
Is there anything you’d like to add? 
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Appendix E - Participant information sheet 
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Appendix F - Consent form  
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Appendix G - Example transcript of interview with Paul 
Please note that the line numbers are different to the line numbers provided in the transcripts to examiners 
due to formatting considerations. S refers to the first letter of the researcher’s name. All names and 
potentially identifying information have been anonymised.  
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Appendix H - Example of first stage of exploratory comments - Max 
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Appendix I - Example of expanding coding  
Comments are colour coded accordingly – blue for personal reflections, green for linguistic 
comments, orange for conceptual comments, and red for descriptive comments. 
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Appendix J - Example mind map of emerging themes for Brian 
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Appendix K – Master table of themes and frequency 
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Appendix L - Entry from reflective journal  
